Illuminating Errors

Rodrigo Borges is a Lecturer at the University of Florida. He works mainly in epistemology. He is currently working on a monograph about the Gettier Problem and knowledge. Ian Schnee is an Associate Teaching Professor at the University of Washington. He is the author of The Logic Course Adventure, an interactive textbook for formal logic courses. Besides epistemology, his research interests include philosophy of film, philosophy of video games, and pedagogy.

"This book is unique in that it takes a highly focused set of questions that revolve around knowledge from non-knowledge and advances discussion of these questions from the perspectives of hinge-epistemology, anti-luck approaches to knowledge involving both safety and sensitivity constraints, virtue-theoretic epistemology, and knowledge-first approaches that emphasize the roles knowledge plays in licensing both theoretical and practical inferences." Aaron Rizzieri, Coconino Community College

• Introduction Rodrigo Borges and Ian Schnee Part 1: The Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge Section 1: Justification and Essential Falsehoods 1. Norms of Belief and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge E.J. Coffman 2. We Are Justified in Believing that KFK is Fundamentally Wrong Peter D. Klein 3. No Knowledge From Falsity Fred Adams 4. Harmless Falsehoods Martin Montminy 5. Knowledge from Blindspots Rhys Borchert, Juan Comesaña, and Timothy Kearl Section 2: Gettier, Safety and Defeasibility 6. Knowledge from Error and Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology Duncan Pritchard 7. Epistemic Alchemy? Stephen Hetherington 8. The Benign/Malignant Distinction for False Premises Claudio de Almeida 9. Knowledge, Falsehood, and Defeat Sven Bernecker Part 2: Beyond the Possibility of Knowledge from Non-Knowledge Section 3: Reasoning, Hinges and Cornerstones 10. The Developmental Psychology of Sherlock Holmes: Counter-Closure Precedes Closure Roy Sorensen 11. Inferential Knowledge, Counter Closure, and Cognition Michael Blome-Tillmann and Brian Ball 12. Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: A Dialogue Michael Veber 13. Vaults Across Reasoning Peter Murphy 14. Entitlement, Leaching and Counter-Closure Federico Luzzi Section 4: Knowledge: From Falsehoods and of Falsehoods 15. Why is Knowledge from Falsehood Possible? An Explanation John Turri 16. The Assertion Norm of Knowing John Biro 17. Knowledge Without Factivity Kate Nolfi 18. Knowing the Facts, Alternative and Otherwise Clayton Littlejohn