J. A. Cover is professor of philosophy at Purdue University. Leaving a research post after completing a B.S. in biochemistry and biophysics at the University of California, Davis, he took a B.A. in philosophy at Syracuse University, where he later received his M.A. and Ph.D. Published widely in journals and books on issues in early modern philosophy, metaphysics, and philosophy of science, he is coeditor of Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy (Hackett, 1990), coauthor of Theories of Knowledge and Reality, Second Edition (McGraw-Hill, 1994), coauthor of Leibniz on Substance and Individuation (Cambridge, 1999), and coeditor of Leibniz: Nature and Freedom (Oxford, 2005). Martin Curd is associate professor of philosophy at Purdue University. He has a B.A. in natural sciences from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. in history and philosophy of science from the University of Pittsburgh. Working mainly in philosophy of science and epistemology, he is coeditor of The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (2008). Christopher Pincock is associate professor of philosophy at The Ohio State University. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California, Berkeley in 2002. Pincock has published articles in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mathematics and the history of analytic philosophy. His book Mathematics and Scientific Representation (Oxford) was published in 2012.

• (*= New to this Edition) PrefaceGeneral Introduction1 | Science and PseudoscienceIntroductionKarl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?Imre Lakatos, Science and PseudosciencePaul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a PseudoscienceMichael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not ScienceLarry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar—Causes for ConcernCommentary2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in ScienceIntroductionThomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific RevolutionsThomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory ChoiceErnan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in ScienceLarry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of MethodologyHelen E. Longino, Values and ObjectivityKathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological SciencesCommentary3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and UnderdeterminationIntroductionPierre Duhem, Physical Theory and ExperimentW. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of EmpiricismDonald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine ThesisLarry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination*Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary4 | Induction, Prediction, and EvidenceIntroductionPeter Lipton, InductionKarl Popper, The Problem of InductionWesley C. Salmon, Rational PredictionCarl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and AcceptabilityPeter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight?*Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of InductionCommentary5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian ApproachesIntroductionWesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science*Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way*Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian ApproachPaul Horwich, Therapeutic BayesianismCommentary6 | Models of ExplanationIntroductionRudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and PredictionCarl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific ExplanationCarl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural IdentityCarl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical ExplanationPeter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation*Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification*James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal ExplanationCommentary7 | Laws of NatureIntroductionA. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature?Fred I. Dretske, Laws of NatureD. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural LawsNancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?Commentary8 | Intertheoretic ReductionIntroductionErnest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive ExplanationsPaul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist*Jerry A. Fodor, Special SciencesPhilip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two SciencesCommentary9 | Empiricism and Scientific RealismIntroductionGrover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical EntitiesBas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific RealismAlan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive EmpiricismLarry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism*Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two FallaciesIan Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific RealismDavid B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism*Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle ArgumentArthur Fine, The Natural Ontological AttitudeAlan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark—Fine for RealismCommentary_____GlossaryBibliography  Name IndexSubject Index

J. A. Cover is professor of philosophy at Purdue University. Leaving a research post after completing a B.S. in biochemistry and biophysics at the University of California, Davis, he took a B.A. in philosophy at Syracuse University, where he later received his M.A. and Ph.D. Published widely in journals and books on issues in early modern philosophy, metaphysics, and philosophy of science, he is coeditor of Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy (Hackett, 1990), coauthor of Theories of Knowledge and Reality, Second Edition (McGraw-Hill, 1994), coauthor of Leibniz on Substance and Individuation (Cambridge, 1999), and coeditor of Leibniz: Nature and Freedom (Oxford, 2005). Martin Curd is associate professor of philosophy at Purdue University. He has a B.A. in natural sciences from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. in history and philosophy of science from the University of Pittsburgh. Working mainly in philosophy of science and epistemology, he is coeditor of The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (2008). Christopher Pincock is associate professor of philosophy at The Ohio State University. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California, Berkeley in 2002. Pincock has published articles in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mathematics and the history of analytic philosophy. His book Mathematics and Scientific Representation (Oxford) was published in 2012.

• (*= New to this Edition) PrefaceGeneral Introduction1 | Science and PseudoscienceIntroductionKarl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?Imre Lakatos, Science and PseudosciencePaul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a PseudoscienceMichael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not ScienceLarry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar—Causes for ConcernCommentary2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in ScienceIntroductionThomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific RevolutionsThomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory ChoiceErnan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in ScienceLarry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of MethodologyHelen E. Longino, Values and ObjectivityKathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological SciencesCommentary3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and UnderdeterminationIntroductionPierre Duhem, Physical Theory and ExperimentW. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of EmpiricismDonald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine ThesisLarry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination*Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary4 | Induction, Prediction, and EvidenceIntroductionPeter Lipton, InductionKarl Popper, The Problem of InductionWesley C. Salmon, Rational PredictionCarl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and AcceptabilityPeter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight?*Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of InductionCommentary5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian ApproachesIntroductionWesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science*Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way*Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian ApproachPaul Horwich, Therapeutic BayesianismCommentary6 | Models of ExplanationIntroductionRudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and PredictionCarl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific ExplanationCarl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural IdentityCarl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical ExplanationPeter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation*Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification*James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal ExplanationCommentary7 | Laws of NatureIntroductionA. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature?Fred I. Dretske, Laws of NatureD. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural LawsNancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?Commentary8 | Intertheoretic ReductionIntroductionErnest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive ExplanationsPaul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist*Jerry A. Fodor, Special SciencesPhilip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two SciencesCommentary9 | Empiricism and Scientific RealismIntroductionGrover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical EntitiesBas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific RealismAlan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive EmpiricismLarry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism*Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two FallaciesIan Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific RealismDavid B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism*Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle ArgumentArthur Fine, The Natural Ontological AttitudeAlan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark—Fine for RealismCommentary_____GlossaryBibliography  Name IndexSubject Index

J. A. Cover is professor of philosophy at Purdue University. Leaving a research post after completing a B.S. in biochemistry and biophysics at the University of California, Davis, he took a B.A. in philosophy at Syracuse University, where he later received his M.A. and Ph.D. Published widely in journals and books on issues in early modern philosophy, metaphysics, and philosophy of science, he is coeditor of Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy (Hackett, 1990), coauthor of Theories of Knowledge and Reality, Second Edition (McGraw-Hill, 1994), coauthor of Leibniz on Substance and Individuation (Cambridge, 1999), and coeditor of Leibniz: Nature and Freedom (Oxford, 2005). Martin Curd is associate professor of philosophy at Purdue University. He has a B.A. in natural sciences from Cambridge University and a Ph.D. in history and philosophy of science from the University of Pittsburgh. Working mainly in philosophy of science and epistemology, he is coeditor of The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (2008). Christopher Pincock is associate professor of philosophy at The Ohio State University. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California, Berkeley in 2002. Pincock has published articles in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mathematics and the history of analytic philosophy. His book Mathematics and Scientific Representation (Oxford) was published in 2012.

• (*= New to this Edition) PrefaceGeneral Introduction1 | Science and PseudoscienceIntroductionKarl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?Imre Lakatos, Science and PseudosciencePaul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a PseudoscienceMichael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not ScienceLarry Laudan, Commentary: Science at the Bar—Causes for ConcernCommentary2 | Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in ScienceIntroductionThomas S. Kuhn, The Nature and Necessity of Scientific RevolutionsThomas S. Kuhn, Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory ChoiceErnan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in ScienceLarry Laudan, Kuhn’s Critique of MethodologyHelen E. Longino, Values and ObjectivityKathleen Okruhlik, Gender and the Biological SciencesCommentary3 | The Duhem-Quine Thesis and UnderdeterminationIntroductionPierre Duhem, Physical Theory and ExperimentW. V. Quine, Two Dogmas of EmpiricismDonald Gillies, The Duhem Thesis and the Quine ThesisLarry Laudan, Demystifying Underdetermination*Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, The Duhem Problem Commentary4 | Induction, Prediction, and EvidenceIntroductionPeter Lipton, InductionKarl Popper, The Problem of InductionWesley C. Salmon, Rational PredictionCarl G. Hempel, Criteria of Confirmation and AcceptabilityPeter Achinstein, Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight?*Nelson Goodman, The New Riddle of InductionCommentary5 | Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian ApproachesIntroductionWesley C. Salmon, Rationality and Objectivity in Science*Deborah G. Mayo, A Critique of Salmon’s Bayesian Way*Alan Chalmers, The Bayesian ApproachPaul Horwich, Therapeutic BayesianismCommentary6 | Models of ExplanationIntroductionRudolf Carnap, The Value of Laws: Explanation and PredictionCarl G. Hempel, Two Basic Types of Scientific ExplanationCarl G. Hempel, The Thesis of Structural IdentityCarl G. Hempel, Inductive-Statistical ExplanationPeter Railton, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation*Philip Kitcher, Explanatory Unification*James Woodward, The Manipulability Conception of Causal ExplanationCommentary7 | Laws of NatureIntroductionA. J. Ayer, What Is a Law of Nature?Fred I. Dretske, Laws of NatureD. H. Mellor, Necessities and Universals in Natural LawsNancy Cartwright, Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?Commentary8 | Intertheoretic ReductionIntroductionErnest Nagel, Issues in the Logic of Reductive ExplanationsPaul K. Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist*Jerry A. Fodor, Special SciencesPhilip Kitcher, 1953 and All That: A Tale of Two SciencesCommentary9 | Empiricism and Scientific RealismIntroductionGrover Maxwell, The Ontological Status of Theoretical EntitiesBas C. van Fraassen, Arguments Concerning Scientific RealismAlan Musgrave, Realism versus Constructive EmpiricismLarry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism*Juha T. Saatsi, On the Pessimistic Induction and Two FallaciesIan Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific RealismDavid B. Resnik, Hacking’s Experimental Realism*Martin Carrier, What Is Right with the Miracle ArgumentArthur Fine, The Natural Ontological AttitudeAlan Musgrave, NOA’s Ark—Fine for RealismCommentary_____GlossaryBibliography  Name IndexSubject Index