`Thomas Andersson's new book makes important advances in both the theory and policy analysis of multinationals by endogenizing the foreign investment decision, and then by exploiting simple game theory techniques. His work correctly emphasizes that welfare effects depend crucially on the structure of the game which determines whether or not investment actually occurs.' - James R. Markusen, University of Colorado at Boulder

• Part I: Introduction 1. Statement of the Issues 2. Theoretical Background Part II: Taxation of MNE-Affi liates 3. Taxation of MNE Affiliates by Competing Host Countries 4. Foreign Exchange versus Pollution Part III: Nationalisation of MNE Affiliates 5. Nationalisation of MNE Affiliates by Competing Host Countries 6. Cross-country Variation in Nationalisation 7. Duration of Nationalisation Part IV: Conclusion and Policy Implications 8. Conclusions