Arguing about Metaethics

Häftad, Engelska, 2006

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Beskrivning

Arguing about Metaethics collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics: Do moral properties exist? If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it? If they don’t exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language? What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation? As well as these questions, this volume discusses a wide range of issues including moral objectivity, truth and moral judgements, moral psychology, thick evaluative concepts and moral relativism. The editors provide lucid introductions to each of the eleven themed sections in which they show how the debate lies and outline the arguments of the papers. Arguing about Metaethics is an ideal resource text for students at upper undergraduate or postgraduate level.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2006-07-10
Mått:174 x 246 x 50 mm
Vikt:1 540 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Arguing About Philosophy
Antal sidor:640
Förlag:Taylor & Francis Ltd
ISBN:9780415380270

Utforska kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Recensioner i media

'In recent years, metaethics has been one of the most exciting growth areas in philosophy. This volume contains the most comprehensive and up-to-date set of readings currently available, and will be valued by advanced undergraduates, postgraduates, and professionals with interests in recent and contemporary metaethics.' - Alex Miller, Macquarie University'The selection here is good, and quite appropriate for upper level metaethics undergraduate courses (of which there are, as the authors point out, plenty). This would be a good collection that would certainly fill a gap.' - Richard Holton, MIT

Innehållsförteckning

1. The Open Question Argument 2. Error Theory and Moral Realism 3. Moral Realism after Moore: Naturalism 4. Moral Realism after Moore: Non-naturalism 5. Expressivism 6. Expressivism and the Frege-Geach Problem 8. Expressivism and Minimalism about Truth 9. Expressivism and Non-natural Moral Realism 10. Thick Concepts 11. Judgement and Motivation 12. Humean Theory of Motivation