In Emotions and Reasons, Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.
Patricia S. Greenspan writes on topics in philosophical psychology and ethics.
Recensioner i media
"A valuable contribution that opens up new questions and provides interesting insights into old issues." -- Choice"Greenspan's book makes an interesting contribution to our understanding of emotional justification, and rightly creates a place in the philosophy of action and ethics for emotion as an object of study." -- Times LiterarySupplement
Innehållsförteckning
Part 1: Emotions as 'Extrajudgemental' Evaluations. 1. Reasons to Feel: Sketch of an Argument 2. Emotions without Essences: Varieties of Fear 3. Some Morally Significant Emotions: Rewards and Punishments 4. Perceptual Warrant: Suspicion Revisted 5. Rationally Appropriate Ambivalence: Contrary Emotions 6. Justifying Emotion: What One Ought to Feel
