First published in 1997, this volume advances the view that the nature of truth, in so far as truth has a ‘nature’, lies in the manner of its occurrence. Edo Pivčevicì argues that truth is an vent, i.e. it does not exist until it occurs, and survives only as long as the requisite conditions for its occurrence are in place. Positing that language sets traps for the unwary, Pivčevicì states that calling ‘x’ true involves a property ascription does so only in the sense that ‘x’ enters into truth and is part of a ‘truth event’.

First published in 1997, this volume advances the view that the nature of truth, in so far as truth has a ‘nature’, lies in the manner of its occurrence. Edo Pivčevicì argues that truth is an vent, i.e. it does not exist until it occurs, and survives only as long as the requisite conditions for its occurrence are in place. Positing that language sets traps for the unwary, Pivčevicì states that calling ‘x’ true involves a property ascription does so only in the sense that ‘x’ enters into truth and is part of a ‘truth event’.

First published in 1997, this volume advances the view that the nature of truth, in so far as truth has a ‘nature’, lies in the manner of its occurrence. Edo Pivčevicì argues that truth is an vent, i.e. it does not exist until it occurs, and survives only as long as the requisite conditions for its occurrence are in place. Positing that language sets traps for the unwary, Pivčevicì states that calling ‘x’ true involves a property ascription does so only in the sense that ‘x’ enters into truth and is part of a ‘truth event’.