How to Know

Stephen Hetherington is Professor of Philosophy at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. He has previously published six books, mostly in epistemology. These include Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge (2001), Reality? Knowledge? Philosophy! (2003), Self-Knowledge (2007), and Yes, But How Do You Know? (2009). He has also edited two books, including Epistemology Futures (2006).

“In his latest book, How to Know, Stephen Hetherington forcefully challenges the orthodox conception of knowledge that has come to dominate nearly all contemporary discussions of knowledge. Hetherington's project is not merely critical, however. Instead he proposes a novel alternative theory of knowledge that he calls Practicalism, a theory that says that at root, all propositional knowledge (knowledge that) is ultimately reducible to practical knowledge (knowledge how).  …  Presuppositions and supposed platitudes in philosophy deserve to be challenged. Hetherington's highly original and insightful book does just that. Whether or not one accepts all aspects of Hetherington's alternative positive proposal, epistemologists will have much to gain from engaging with the details of his substantial contribution to the field.”  (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 28 February 2012)

• Preface and Acknowledgements x 1 The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge 11.1 'Knowing is a Belief State (or Something Similar)' 11.2 'Knowledge is Well Supported' 41.3 'Knowledge is Absolute' 61.4 'Knowing Includes not being Gettiered' 91.5 'Knowledge-that is Fundamentally Theoretical, not Knowledge-how' 101.6 The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge 111.7 Prima Facie Core Problems 121.7.1 The justificationism problem 131.7.2 The Gettierism problem 171.7.3 The theoreticalism problem 202 Knowledge-that as Knowledge-how 262.1 The Rylean Distinction 262.2 The Rylean Argument 282.3 Wittgenstein on Rule-following 312.4 The Knowledge-as-Ability Hypothesis 342.5 Justification 472.6 Grades of Knowledge 492.7 Denying Knowledge-Absolutism: Clear Precedents 512.7.1 Augustus de Morgan 512.7.2 Rudolf Carnap 522.7.3 Norman Malcolm 532.7.4 W. V. O. Quine 532.7.5 Jaakko Hintikka 542.7.6 David Lewis 542.7.7 Alvin Goldman 552.7.8 Christopher Peacocke 562.7.9 Ernest Sosa 572.7.10 Baron Reed 582.8 Denying Knowledge-Absolutism: Possibly only Apparent Precedents 602.8.1 Locke 602.8.2 Russell 612.8.3 Contextualism 622.9 Sceptical Challenges 652.10 Sceptical Limitations 672.11 Epistemic Agents 702.12 Abilities 732.13 Rylean Mistakes 742.14 Conclusion 753 Gettier? No Problem 763.1 Gettier Situations 773.2 A Counter-Example to 'Gettier's Official Result' 803.3 Ordinary Gettiered Knowledge 823.4 A Meta-Gettier Problem 843.5 Objections Answered 843.6 Gettier-Luck as Veritic Luck? 883.7 Gettier-Luck is not Veritic Luck 903.8 Gettier-Luck is Combinatorial Luck 923.9 Combinatorial Luck: Applications 943.10 Knowing in a Combinatorially Lucky Way 983.11 Gettier-Holism Versus Gettier-Partialism 1013.12 Combinatorial Safety 1063.13 Combinatorial Gradational Safety 1093.14 Epistemological Privilege and Epistemological Empathy 1113.15 Gettier Situations and Sceptical Situations 1163.16 Timothy Williamson 1204 Is this a World where Knowledge has to Include Justification? 1294.1 Justificationism, Broadly Understood 1294.2 The 'Causally Stable World' (CSW) Thesis 1314.3 Knowledge Within Causally Fluky Worlds 1354.4 Knowledge as Putatively Pervasive 1434.5 Non-tethering Justification 1464.6 Linguistic Intuitions 1484.7 Kinds of Intension 1504.8 Conditional Justificationism 1524.9 Knowledge Within Different Possible Worlds 1554.10 Wholly General Justificationism 1574.11 A Thin or Minimal Concept of Justificationism 1604.12 Knowledge Within Causally Semi-fluky Worlds 1634.13 Evidence and Counter-Evidence 1654.14 Timothy Williamson 1665 Knowledge-that as How-Knowledge 1695.1 Knowing How it is that p 1695.2 How-Knowledge that p and Gradualism 1715.3 Degrees of Knowledge and Degrees of Belief 1795.4 How-Knowledge that p and Truthmakers 1825.5 Knowledge that p and Gradualism 1845.6 Knowledge-Gradualism's Central Concept 1865.7 Can there be Minimal Knowledge? 1895.8 Minimal Knowledge as Foundational Knowledge 1905.9 Knowledge-Gradualism: Closure and Scepticism 1945.10 Knowledge-Gradualism: Content Externalism and Self-Knowledge 2015.11 How not to Argue for Knowledge-Absolutism 2045.12 Linguistic Evidence: Igor Douven 2055.13 Linguistic Evidence: Jason Stanley 2085.14 How-Knowledge-how that p 2135.15 Knowing as Understanding? 2146 A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge 2196.1 This Book's Theory: A Summary and a Name 2196.2 Core Problems Evaded 2226.3 Further Practicalist Reconceptions 2246.4 A Predictive Practicalism? 2326.5 J. L. Austin on 'Trouser-words' 2326.6 Wittgensteinian Certainty — Generalised 237References 241Index 254