David Austen-Smith is Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy and Professor of Political Science and Economics at Northwestern University. The late Jeffrey S. Banks was Professor of Political Science at California Institute of Technology.

Explores the connection between individuals' preferences within any society and the collective choices of that society, taking an indirect or game- theoretic approach to the aggregation of individual preferences." —Journal of Economic Literature

• Acknowledgments vii; Preface ix; 1 Preliminaries 1; 1.1 Review 1; 1.2 Decision theory 8; 1.3 Discussion 17; 1.4 Exercises 17; 1.5 Further reading 18; 2 Strategy-Proof Collective Choice 19; 2.1 Strategy-proofness on finite sets 20; 2.2 Application: The amendment rule 29; 2.3 Strategy-proofness and Arrovian aggregation 30; 2.4 Single-peaked preferences 33; 2.5 Application: The amendment rule revisited 51; 2.6 Strategy-proofness in the spatial model 52; 2.7 Application: The issue-by-issue rule 60; 2.8 Separable preferences 62; 2.9 Discussion 65; 2.10 Exercises 66; 2.11 Further reading 67; 3 Implementable Collective Choice 69; 3.1 Mechanisms and equilibria 70; 3.2 The Revelation Principle 74; 3.3 Nash implementation 77; 3.4 Application: Monotonicity of electoral rules 90; 3.5 Quasi-linear preferences 94; 3.6 Application: Collective action 104; 3.7 Discussion 105; 3.8 Exercises 109; 3.9 Further reading 110; 4 Binary Agendas 113; 4.1 Binary agendas and sophisticated voting 114; 4.2 Equilibrium outcomes of binary agendas 128; 4.3 Application: Agenda independence 138; 4.4 Discussion 141; 4.5 Exercises 144; 4.6 Further reading 146; 5 Spatial Voting in Committees 147; 5.1 Issue-by-issue voting in the spatial model 148; 5.2 Application: Committees and cabinets 158; 5.3 Endogenous agendas 166; 5.4 Application: Sophisticated sincerity 184; 5.5 Discussion 186; 5.6 Exercises 188; 5.7 Further reading 190; 6 Legislative Bargaining 193; 6.1 A basic framework 194; 6.2 Bargaining over distributions 204; 6.3 Application: Pork barrel politics 221; 6.4 Bargaining over policy 224; 6.5 Application: Coalition government formation 244; 6.6 Discussion 248; 6.7 Exercises 250; 6.8 Further reading 251; 7 Two-Candidate Elections 253; 7.1 Electoral equilibrium and the core 254; 7.2 Application: Ideological convergence 259; 7.3 Equilibrium in multidimensional spaces 262; 7.4 Application: Progressive taxation 280; 7.5 Probabilistic voting 282; 7.6 Application: Director's Law 289; 7.7 Policy-motivated candidates 293; 7.8 Application: Ideological divergence 301; 7.9 Turnout 304; 7.10 Discussion 322; 7.11 Exercises 328; 7.12 Further reading 330; 8 Multicandidate Elections 333; 8.1 Sincere voting in multicandidate elections 335; 8.2 Application: Comparing electoral rules 342; 8.3 Strategic voting 344; 8.4 Application: Duverger's Law 352; 8.5 Candidate entry 353; 8.6 Application: Duverger and divergence 380; 8.7 Discussion 382; 8.8 Exercises 388; 8.9 Further reading 389; 9 Legislative Elections 391; 9.1 Elections, government and policy 392; 9.2 Application: Representative legislatures 413; 9.3 Discussion 415; 9.4 Exercises 416; 9.5 Further reading 417; 10 Summary and Conclusions 419; 10.1 Retrospective 421; 10.2 A conclusion 427; Bibliography 429; Index 445

David Austen-Smith is Earl Dean Howard Distinguished Professor of Political Economy and Professor of Political Science and Economics at Northwestern University. The late Jeffrey S. Banks was Professor of Political Science at California Institute of Technology.

Explores the connection between individuals' preferences within any society and the collective choices of that society, taking an indirect or game- theoretic approach to the aggregation of individual preferences." —Journal of Economic Literature

• Acknowledgments vii; Preface ix; 1 Preliminaries 1; 1.1 Review 1; 1.2 Decision theory 8; 1.3 Discussion 17; 1.4 Exercises 17; 1.5 Further reading 18; 2 Strategy-Proof Collective Choice 19; 2.1 Strategy-proofness on finite sets 20; 2.2 Application: The amendment rule 29; 2.3 Strategy-proofness and Arrovian aggregation 30; 2.4 Single-peaked preferences 33; 2.5 Application: The amendment rule revisited 51; 2.6 Strategy-proofness in the spatial model 52; 2.7 Application: The issue-by-issue rule 60; 2.8 Separable preferences 62; 2.9 Discussion 65; 2.10 Exercises 66; 2.11 Further reading 67; 3 Implementable Collective Choice 69; 3.1 Mechanisms and equilibria 70; 3.2 The Revelation Principle 74; 3.3 Nash implementation 77; 3.4 Application: Monotonicity of electoral rules 90; 3.5 Quasi-linear preferences 94; 3.6 Application: Collective action 104; 3.7 Discussion 105; 3.8 Exercises 109; 3.9 Further reading 110; 4 Binary Agendas 113; 4.1 Binary agendas and sophisticated voting 114; 4.2 Equilibrium outcomes of binary agendas 128; 4.3 Application: Agenda independence 138; 4.4 Discussion 141; 4.5 Exercises 144; 4.6 Further reading 146; 5 Spatial Voting in Committees 147; 5.1 Issue-by-issue voting in the spatial model 148; 5.2 Application: Committees and cabinets 158; 5.3 Endogenous agendas 166; 5.4 Application: Sophisticated sincerity 184; 5.5 Discussion 186; 5.6 Exercises 188; 5.7 Further reading 190; 6 Legislative Bargaining 193; 6.1 A basic framework 194; 6.2 Bargaining over distributions 204; 6.3 Application: Pork barrel politics 221; 6.4 Bargaining over policy 224; 6.5 Application: Coalition government formation 244; 6.6 Discussion 248; 6.7 Exercises 250; 6.8 Further reading 251; 7 Two-Candidate Elections 253; 7.1 Electoral equilibrium and the core 254; 7.2 Application: Ideological convergence 259; 7.3 Equilibrium in multidimensional spaces 262; 7.4 Application: Progressive taxation 280; 7.5 Probabilistic voting 282; 7.6 Application: Director's Law 289; 7.7 Policy-motivated candidates 293; 7.8 Application: Ideological divergence 301; 7.9 Turnout 304; 7.10 Discussion 322; 7.11 Exercises 328; 7.12 Further reading 330; 8 Multicandidate Elections 333; 8.1 Sincere voting in multicandidate elections 335; 8.2 Application: Comparing electoral rules 342; 8.3 Strategic voting 344; 8.4 Application: Duverger's Law 352; 8.5 Candidate entry 353; 8.6 Application: Duverger and divergence 380; 8.7 Discussion 382; 8.8 Exercises 388; 8.9 Further reading 389; 9 Legislative Elections 391; 9.1 Elections, government and policy 392; 9.2 Application: Representative legislatures 413; 9.3 Discussion 415; 9.4 Exercises 416; 9.5 Further reading 417; 10 Summary and Conclusions 419; 10.1 Retrospective 421; 10.2 A conclusion 427; Bibliography 429; Index 445