The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform

Theory, Evidence and Policy

AvJohann Graf Lambsdorff

Häftad, Engelska, 2008

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Beskrivning

Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2008-07-10
Mått:152 x 229 x 17 mm
Vikt:450 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:304
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521068673

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Mer om författaren

Johann Graf Lambsdorff is Chair in Economic Theory at the University of Passau, Germany, and senior research consultant to Transparency International.

Recensioner i media

Review of the hardback: 'Lambsdorff provides a sound institutional economic analysis of corruption and possible reforms. This book will improve our understanding of the difficult topic of corruption and will help policy makers to better cope with its consequences. It will be the standard treatment of this subject for many years to come.' Friedrich Schneider, Professor of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz

Innehållsförteckning

Acknowledgements; A roadmap to this book; 1. Introduction; 2. Enemies of corruption; 3. What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach; 4. The dilemma of the kleptocrat: what is bad about political corruption?; 5. Corruption and transactions costs: the rent-seeking perspective; 6. Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law; 7. Exporters' ethics and the art of bribery; 8. How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: an empirical approach; 9. Corrupt relational contracting; 10. Concluding thoughts; Annex: Technical details to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index; References; Index.