Review of the hardback: 'Professors Scott and Stephan have produced an important and thought-provoking book on the intersection of contract theory and international law. The authors contend that there is too much enforcement of international law by private parties who file complaints before international tribunals and domestic courts armed with the power to sanction nations that fail to live up to their treaty bargains. This is a provocative claim, one that challenges the widely-held views of international lawyers and political scientists that the international legal system is weak and needs to be strengthened. The authors support their theory of optimal enforcement of international agreements with numerous examples ranging across human rights, trade, international criminal law, and intellectual property. And they include specific prescriptions for governments and policymakers. Scholars of international cooperation and treaty design would do well to give The Limits of Leviathan the careful attention that it deserves.' Laurence R. Helfer, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School

• Foreword; 1. Introduction; 2. States, firms, and the enforcement of international law; 3. Lessons from contract theory; 4. A model of optimal enforcement; 5. Patterns of international law enforcement; 6. The choice between formal and informal enforcement; 7. The future of international law and its enforcement; Glossary; Table of authorities; Index.

Review of the hardback: 'Professors Scott and Stephan have produced an important and thought-provoking book on the intersection of contract theory and international law. The authors contend that there is too much enforcement of international law by private parties who file complaints before international tribunals and domestic courts armed with the power to sanction nations that fail to live up to their treaty bargains. This is a provocative claim, one that challenges the widely-held views of international lawyers and political scientists that the international legal system is weak and needs to be strengthened. The authors support their theory of optimal enforcement of international agreements with numerous examples ranging across human rights, trade, international criminal law, and intellectual property. And they include specific prescriptions for governments and policymakers. Scholars of international cooperation and treaty design would do well to give The Limits of Leviathan the careful attention that it deserves.' Laurence R. Helfer, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School

• Foreword; 1. Introduction; 2. States, firms, and the enforcement of international law; 3. Lessons from contract theory; 4. A model of optimal enforcement; 5. Patterns of international law enforcement; 6. The choice between formal and informal enforcement; 7. The future of international law and its enforcement; Glossary; Table of authorities; Index.

Review of the hardback: 'Professors Scott and Stephan have produced an important and thought-provoking book on the intersection of contract theory and international law. The authors contend that there is too much enforcement of international law by private parties who file complaints before international tribunals and domestic courts armed with the power to sanction nations that fail to live up to their treaty bargains. This is a provocative claim, one that challenges the widely-held views of international lawyers and political scientists that the international legal system is weak and needs to be strengthened. The authors support their theory of optimal enforcement of international agreements with numerous examples ranging across human rights, trade, international criminal law, and intellectual property. And they include specific prescriptions for governments and policymakers. Scholars of international cooperation and treaty design would do well to give The Limits of Leviathan the careful attention that it deserves.' Laurence R. Helfer, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School

• Foreword; 1. Introduction; 2. States, firms, and the enforcement of international law; 3. Lessons from contract theory; 4. A model of optimal enforcement; 5. Patterns of international law enforcement; 6. The choice between formal and informal enforcement; 7. The future of international law and its enforcement; Glossary; Table of authorities; Index.