Knowledge and Evidence

Häftad, Engelska, 1991

Del i serien Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

495 kr

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Beskrivning

Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we have no justified beliefs about the external world, the book outlines a theory of rational belief.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1991-07-26
Mått:142 x 217 x 19 mm
Vikt:425 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Antal sidor:300
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521423632

Utforska kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Mer om författaren

Paul K. Moser is Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago. He is the author of The Elusive God (Cambridge University Press, 2008), editor of Jesus and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2008), and co-editor of Divine Hiddenness (Cambridge University Press, 2002) and of The Rationality of Theism (Routledge, 2003). He is also editor of the journal American Philosophical Quarterly. He is currently writing a book titled The Evidence for God for a non-scholarly audience (to be published by Cambridge University Press).

Recensioner i media

'Moser has produced a foundationalist account of justification and knowledge … that in some respects is superior to anything else in the literature.' W. Alston, Syracuse University

Innehållsförteckning

Acknowedgments; Introduction; 1. Conditions for propositional knowledge; 2. Minimal epistemic reasons; 3. Justifying epistemic reasons; 4. Foundationalism and some alternatives; 5. Procedural epistemic rationality; 6. Propositional knowledge; References; Index.