Jonathan G. S. Koppell is Assistant Professor of Politics, Policy and Organization at the Yale School of Management, Yale University.

'There is much of interest in the issues explored by the book and there is a considerable amount of evidence about the cases presented.' Journal of Public Administration

• List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; List of acronyms; 1. Introduction; 2. Building a better model of bureaucratic control; 3. Administration by regulation; 4. Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control; 5. Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests; 6. The limits of congressional control: agent structure as constraint; 7. Regulating hybrids: structure and control; 8. Conclusion; Appendix: background of organizations studied; Interview subjects; References; Index.

Jonathan G. S. Koppell is Assistant Professor of Politics, Policy and Organization at the Yale School of Management, Yale University.

'There is much of interest in the issues explored by the book and there is a considerable amount of evidence about the cases presented.' Journal of Public Administration

• List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; List of acronyms; 1. Introduction; 2. Building a better model of bureaucratic control; 3. Administration by regulation; 4. Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control; 5. Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests; 6. The limits of congressional control: agent structure as constraint; 7. Regulating hybrids: structure and control; 8. Conclusion; Appendix: background of organizations studied; Interview subjects; References; Index.

Jonathan G. S. Koppell is Assistant Professor of Politics, Policy and Organization at the Yale School of Management, Yale University.

'There is much of interest in the issues explored by the book and there is a considerable amount of evidence about the cases presented.' Journal of Public Administration

• List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; List of acronyms; 1. Introduction; 2. Building a better model of bureaucratic control; 3. Administration by regulation; 4. Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control; 5. Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests; 6. The limits of congressional control: agent structure as constraint; 7. Regulating hybrids: structure and control; 8. Conclusion; Appendix: background of organizations studied; Interview subjects; References; Index.