Review of the hardback: 'Gunther Schulze covers a wide range of theories on the motivations for capital controls and why they might fail. His eclectic work encompasses models of taxation drawn from real trade theory as well as from international money and finance. Always, the political-economic motivations of governments restricting capital flows, and the likely welfare consequences, get centre stage. A welcome consolidation and analytica elaboration of hitherto diffused writings in a most important area of international development.' Ronald McKinnon, Stanford University

• List of figures; List of tables; Preface; 1. Introduction; Part I. The Reasons for Capital Controls: 2. Political-economic determinants of capital controls; 3. Capital controls in a small open economy; 4. Extensions: large open economy and unemployment; Part II. The Evasion of Capital Controls: 5. Ways and means to escape the restrictions; 6. Misinvoicing international trade: imports; 7. Misinvoicing international trade: exports; Part III. Empirical Measurement of the Effectiveness of Capital Controls: 8. The effects of capital controls - unexploited profit opportunities?; 9. Return differentials; 10. The correlation of saving and investment; 11. Finale; Appendices; References; Index.

Review of the hardback: 'Gunther Schulze covers a wide range of theories on the motivations for capital controls and why they might fail. His eclectic work encompasses models of taxation drawn from real trade theory as well as from international money and finance. Always, the political-economic motivations of governments restricting capital flows, and the likely welfare consequences, get centre stage. A welcome consolidation and analytica elaboration of hitherto diffused writings in a most important area of international development.' Ronald McKinnon, Stanford University

• List of figures; List of tables; Preface; 1. Introduction; Part I. The Reasons for Capital Controls: 2. Political-economic determinants of capital controls; 3. Capital controls in a small open economy; 4. Extensions: large open economy and unemployment; Part II. The Evasion of Capital Controls: 5. Ways and means to escape the restrictions; 6. Misinvoicing international trade: imports; 7. Misinvoicing international trade: exports; Part III. Empirical Measurement of the Effectiveness of Capital Controls: 8. The effects of capital controls - unexploited profit opportunities?; 9. Return differentials; 10. The correlation of saving and investment; 11. Finale; Appendices; References; Index.

Review of the hardback: 'Gunther Schulze covers a wide range of theories on the motivations for capital controls and why they might fail. His eclectic work encompasses models of taxation drawn from real trade theory as well as from international money and finance. Always, the political-economic motivations of governments restricting capital flows, and the likely welfare consequences, get centre stage. A welcome consolidation and analytica elaboration of hitherto diffused writings in a most important area of international development.' Ronald McKinnon, Stanford University

• List of figures; List of tables; Preface; 1. Introduction; Part I. The Reasons for Capital Controls: 2. Political-economic determinants of capital controls; 3. Capital controls in a small open economy; 4. Extensions: large open economy and unemployment; Part II. The Evasion of Capital Controls: 5. Ways and means to escape the restrictions; 6. Misinvoicing international trade: imports; 7. Misinvoicing international trade: exports; Part III. Empirical Measurement of the Effectiveness of Capital Controls: 8. The effects of capital controls - unexploited profit opportunities?; 9. Return differentials; 10. The correlation of saving and investment; 11. Finale; Appendices; References; Index.