Perfect Deterrence

AvFrank C. Zagare,D. Marc Kilgour

Inbunden, Engelska, 2000

Del 72 i serien Cambridge Studies in International Relations

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Beskrivning

An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2000-09-21
Mått:160 x 236 x 34 mm
Vikt:806 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Cambridge Studies in International Relations
Antal sidor:442
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521781749

Utforska kategorier

Internationella relationer inom Samhälle och politik

Recensioner i media

'The theory of deterrence formed the foundation of American grand strategy during the decades of the Cold War. It is a deeply flawed theory both in terms of logical rigor and consistency with the historical record. Frank C. Zagare and Marc Kilgour convincingly demonstrate the weaknesses of classical deterrence theory and then proceed to develop a new, elegant, game theoretic treatment of all forms of deterrence. Perfect Deterrence Theory explains both why and when credible threats matter. It offers a comprehensive view of deterrence that is neither limited to nuclear weapons nor to conventional weapons, but spans all deterrent circumstances. The authors write in such a lucid style and the modeling is so accessible that this book is bound to influence scholarship and foreign policy strategizing for years to come. Perfect Deterrence is a superb examination of one of the most important foreign policy problems of our time.' Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Hoover Institution for War and Peace, Stanford University

Innehållsförteckning

Part I. Theoretical Underpinnings: 1. Classical deterrence theory; 2. Rationality and deterrence; 3. Credibility: the magic ingredient of deterrence; Part II. Direct Deterrence: 4. Uncertainty and mutual deterrence; 5. Unilateral deterrence; Part III. Extended Deterrence: 6. Extended deterrence; 7. Modeling massive retaliation; 8. Modeling flexible response; 9. Crisis, escalation, and limited war; Part IV. Implications: 10. Perfect deterrence theory.