Michael Smith is Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, at the Australian National University.

• Introduction; Part I. Moral Psychology: 1. Internal reasons; 2. The incoherence argument: reply to Schafer-Landau; 3. Philosophy and commonsense: the case of weakness of will; 4. Frog and toad lose control; 5. A theory of freedom and responsibility; 6. Rational capacities; 7(i) On Humeans, anti-humeans and motivation: a reply to Pettit; 7(ii) Humeanism, psychologism, and the normative story; 8. The possibility of philosophy of action; Part II. Meta-Ethics: 9. Moral realism; 10. Objectivity and moral realism: on the significance of the phenomenology of moral experience; 11. In defence of The Moral Problem: a reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord; 12. Exploring the implications of the dispositional theory of value; 13. Does the evaluative supervene on the natural?; 14. Internalism's wheel; 15. Evaluation, uncertainty, and motivation; 16. Ethics and the a priori: a modern parable.

Michael Smith is Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, at the Australian National University.

• Introduction; Part I. Moral Psychology: 1. Internal reasons; 2. The incoherence argument: reply to Schafer-Landau; 3. Philosophy and commonsense: the case of weakness of will; 4. Frog and toad lose control; 5. A theory of freedom and responsibility; 6. Rational capacities; 7(i) On Humeans, anti-humeans and motivation: a reply to Pettit; 7(ii) Humeanism, psychologism, and the normative story; 8. The possibility of philosophy of action; Part II. Meta-Ethics: 9. Moral realism; 10. Objectivity and moral realism: on the significance of the phenomenology of moral experience; 11. In defence of The Moral Problem: a reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord; 12. Exploring the implications of the dispositional theory of value; 13. Does the evaluative supervene on the natural?; 14. Internalism's wheel; 15. Evaluation, uncertainty, and motivation; 16. Ethics and the a priori: a modern parable.