The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality

Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety

Inbunden, Engelska, 2007

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Beskrivning

Are political understandings of bureaucracy incompatible with Weberian features of administrative neutrality? In examining the question of whether interest groups and elected officials are able to influence how government agencies implement the law, this book identifies the political origins of bureaucratic neutrality. In bridging the traditional gap between questions of internal management (public administration) and external politics (political science), Huber argues that 'strategic neutrality' allows bureaucratic leaders to both manage their subordinates and sustain political support. By analyzing the OSH Act of 1970, Huber demonstrates the political origins and benefits of administrative neutrality, and contrasts it with apolitical and unconstrained administrative implementation. Historical analysis, interviews with field-level bureaucrats and their supervisors, and quantitative analysis provide a rich understanding of the twin difficulties agency leaders face as political actors and personnel managers.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2007-05-07
Mått:152 x 229 x 19 mm
Vikt:560 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:266
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9780521872799

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Mer om författaren

Gregory A. Huber is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University and a fellow of the Institution for Social and Policy Studies. This book is based on his dissertation, which won the 2002 Leonard White Prize of the American Political Science Association. Prior to joining the faculty at Yale, Huber was the Robert Hartley Fellow in Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution.

Recensioner i media

"Strategic Neutrality is a must-read for students of American political institutions, public administration, and public policy. Professor Huber’s book has a new take on a set of ageless questions: to what extent will politics influence bureaucratic decisions, and will politics encourage officials to ignore their policy expertise? Huber argues and convincingly shows that it can be politically optimal for an agency to adopt a norm of professionalism or "neutrality." Brandice Canes-Wrone, Princeton University

Innehållsförteckning

1. Bureaucratic power and strategic neutrality; 2. Political conflict and the Occupational Safety and Health Act; 3. From regulatory search to enforcement; 4. Federal oversight and state OSH Act enforcement; 5. Conclusion.