Public Choice

An Introduction

Häftad, Engelska, 1987

596 kr

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Beskrivning

The 1968 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to one of the founders of public choice theory, James Buchanan, yet many people have only the vaguest idea what public choice is. The book offers and unusually clear and accessible introduction to an important subject. McLean examines the workings of public choice from two related perspectives - collective action and the aggregation of individual preferences into social consensus. The book highlights the paradox at the heart of collective action- that self-interest in the public domain is frequently counterproductive. National defense and clean air are things we all benefit from - they are public goods - but we tend to resist contributing to them. The first part of this book examines how government choice in such areas is shaped, and by whom- political entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, interest groups and ordinary citizens. McLean uses the idea of a public market in which politicians sell what they hope voters will buy, and further considers how and when people (and animals) co-operate to produce public goods even without government coercion. In the second part of the book the author examines the consequences of combining individual preferences, arguing that there is no straightforward way of adding them up to form a 'social ordering' and assesing the implications of this both for electoral reform and for the status of 'the will of the people'.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1987-05-29
Mått:154 x 229 x 17 mm
Vikt:369 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:240
Förlag:John Wiley and Sons Ltd
ISBN:9780631138396

Utforska kategorier

Politisk aktivism inom Samhälle och politik

Mer om författaren

IAIN MCLEAN is Professor of Politics at Oxford University and a Fellow of Nuffield College, UK. He has worked on British politics and public policy for over 30 years. He has been a front bench councillor twice.

Innehållsförteckning

Part 1: Introduction to Public Choice Theory Chapter 1: What is Public Choice?The core principles of public choiceDistinguishing public choice from traditional political scienceThe economic model of political behaviorChapter 2: Individual Choice and Voting BehaviorRational choice theory and voter decision-makingThe median voter theoremVoter turnout and rational ignorancePart 2: Voting Systems and Political CompetitionChapter 3: Voting MechanismsSimple majority rulePlurality votingCondorcet's paradox and Arrow's Impossibility TheoremChapter 4: Political Parties and Spatial VotingThe spatial model of political competitionParty platforms and electoral strategiesThe role of ideology in voting behaviorPart 3: Collective Action and Interest GroupsChapter 5: Collective Action ProblemsThe free-rider problemThe logic of collective actionOvercoming collective action challengesChapter 6: Interest Groups and LobbyingThe role of interest groups in the political processLobbying strategies and political influenceRent-seeking behavior and its economic consequencesPart 4: Government Institutions and BureaucracyChapter 7: Bureaucracy and Principal-Agent ProblemsThe nature of bureaucracyBureaucratic incentives and inefficiencyRegulatory capture and its implicationsChapter 8: Public Spending and Budgetary ProcessesThe political economy of public spendingBudgetary cycles and pork barrel politicsThe role of fiscal institutionsPart 5: Applications and Criticisms of Public ChoiceChapter 9: Public Choice in PracticeApplications to environmental policyPublic choice analysis of healthcare systemsThe political economy of trade policyChapter 10: Criticisms and Debates in Public ChoiceThe limitations of the rational choice assumptionThe role of altruism and social normsPublic choice and the concept of "the public interest"