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Beskrivning
This dissertation aims to construct a non-dogmatic defence of common sense. It tries to show why the absence of justification for the judgements of common sense, which the sceptic reveals, does not invalidate them.
Preface 1 The Problem of Scepticism 12 The Conflict between Scepticism and Common Sense 143 Moore's Defence of Common Sense 404 On the Significance of What We Would Ordinarily Doubt 545 On the Significance of What We Would Ordinarily Claim to Know 766 Wittgenstein on the Philosopher's Use of 'I Know' 1017 Wittgenstein on Certainty 1218 On the Status of Moore-Type Propositions 137Bibliography 164Index 165
