Weighing Goods

John Broome is White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University.

• Preface ix1 Introduction I: The Structure of Good 11.1 Acts versus consequences, and agent relativity 31.2 The Working of ethical considerations 61.3 Teleological structure 101.4 Does good exist? 17Notes 202 Introduction II: Weighing Goods 222.1 Locations of good, and separability 222.2 Three dimensions of locations 252.3 Dimensions with varying lengths 292.4 What things are good? 322.5 An outline of the argument 32Notes 583 Similarity Arguments 393.1 Parfit, Section 1 403.2 Parfit, Section 2 483.3 Harsanyi 51Notes 584 The Separability Theorems 604.1 Two examples 604.2 Definitions and theorems 654.3 The significance of additive separability 704.4 The rectangular field assumption 80Notes 81Appendix to Chapter 4: Proofs 825 Expected Utility and Rationality 905.1 Axiomatic expected utility theory 905.2 The sure-thing principle 945.3 Individuation of outcomes 955.4 Transitivity of preferences 1005.5 Rational requirements of indifference 1045.6 Individuation and the sure-thing principle 1075.7 The dispersion of value amongst states of nature 1105.8 The rectangular field assumption 115Notes 1176 The Coherence of Good 1216.1 The goodness of uncertain prospects 1226.2 Betterness and rational preferences 1316.3 The argument for coherence 1366.4 Representing betterness by utility 1396.5 Bernoulli’s hypothesis 142Notes 1487 Coherence Against the Pareto Principle 1517.1 The conflict 1527.2 Two better principles 1547.3 Welfare economics 159Notes 1648 The Principle of Personal Good 1658.1 Qualifications 1658.2 The beginning of a defence 167Notes 1739 Equality 1749.1 A utilitarian case for equality 1759.2 Types of egalitarianism 1779.3 Equality under uncertainty 1859.4 Fairness and equality 192Notes 20010 The Interpersonal Addition Theorem 20210.1 Proof 20310.2 Connecting dimensions 20910.3 The utilitarian principle of distribution 213Notes 22211 Utilitarian Metaphysics? 22411.1 The intertemporal addition theorem 22411.2 The principle of temporal good 22811.3 The metaphysical argument 23011.4 Conclusion 237Notes 240Bibliography 241Index 251