Wittgenstein, Part I: Essays

P. M. S. Hacker is Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. He is author of Insight and Iffusion (1972, revised ed. 1986), Appearance and Reality (Blackwell, 1987) and Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind (Blackwell, 1990). He edited The Renaissance of Gravure: The Art of S. W. Hayter (1988), Graure and Grace: the Engravings of Roger Vieillard (1993) and co-edited a Festschrift for H. L. A. Hart together with J. Raz. Law, Morality and Society (1977). He has written five books with G. P. Baker, Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning (Blackwell, 1980), Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity (Blackwell, 1985), Frege: Logical Excavations (Blackwell and Oxford University Press, New York, 1984), Language, Sense and Nonsense (Blackwell, 1984), and Scepticism, Rules and Language, (Blackwell, 1984).

"Anyone reading Philosophical Investigations would do well to keep it by their side, not only for its authoritative commentary on particular passages, but also for Hacker's extremely illuminating essays on the themes of the last part of the book: one each on intentionality, induction, the arbitrariness of grammar, negation, methodology in philosophical psychology, memory and recognition the will, intention and the mythology of meaning." London Review of Books "It is as good a commentary on the Investigations as seems humanly possible. This will reamin the definitive starting point for the forseeable future. Indeed, it must rank alongside the greatest contributions to philosophical scholarship (such as Ross on Aristotle or Vaihinger on Kant), since it combines, on a momentous scale, authoritative textual exegesis, philosophical insight, encyclopedic knowledge of the historical background and lucidity of expression. Hacker succeeds brilliantly in showing that these passages are essential to the discussion of language and linguistic meaning that is the leitmotif of the Investigations. The chapter on mental states and processes provides an excellent interpretation and defence of Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical psychology, in particular of his denial that our psychological concepts constitute a 'folk psychology' that must be replaced by a more scientific alternative. Similarly, the chapter on will is the most authoritative discussion yet of Wittgenstein's fiendishly difficult treatment of that topic." Hans-Johann Glock, Times Higher Education Supplement

• Note to the paperback edition ixAcknowledgements xiPreface xivAbbreviations xixI Intentionality 1II Inductive reasoning 49III The arbitrariness of grammar and the bounds of sense 69IV A note on negation 101V Methodology in philosophical psychology 111VI Memory and recognition 157VII Willing and the nature of voluntary action 191VIII Intending 239IX The mythology of meaning something 261Index 285