Rescuing Justice and Equality

G. A. Cohen was Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University.

With his characteristic brilliance and philosophical depth, G.A. Cohen aims to defend a more pure equality and justice by retrieving them from Rawlsian liberalism. The result is a bracing challenge to contemporary complacency about inequality.

• * Preface * Introduction * The Big Issue * Rescuing Equality and Justice * Some Methodological Disagreements * Justice and Fairness * The Two Standpoints * The Greatness of John Rawls * An Outline of the Book Part One: Rescuing Equality from... 1. The Incentives Argument I. The Incentives Argument, The Interpersonal Test, and Community * Incentives, the Difference Principle, and Equality * Nigel Lawson's Tax Cut * On Uttering Arguments in Variable Interpersonal Settings * The Kidnapper's Argument * Community, and the Interpersonal Test * Does the Incentive Argument Pass the Interpersonal Test? II. Testing the Incentive Argument * What Makes the Minor Premiss of the Incentive Argument True? * Why the Incentive Argument Fails the Interpersonal Test * The Incentive Argument and Bad Faith * Should the Poor Reject the Incentive Argument? * First Persons and Third Persons III. Incentives and the Difference Principle * Strict and Lax Readings of the Difference Principle * Why Just People Must Practise the Strict Difference Principle * The Difference Principle and "Daily Life" * Dignity, Fraternity, and The Difference Principle * The Difference Principle and "Mutual Indifference" * The Difference Principle and the Unjust Society 2. The Pareto Argument for Inequality * Introduction * The Argument Expounded * The Argument Challenged * The Argument Rejected * Labour Burden in the Metric of Equality * Inconsistent Metrics * Raising the Baseline * Impartiality and Mutual Advantage * Inequality: A Necessary Evil? * Conclusion 3. The Basic Structure Objection *"The Personal is Political" * Incentives and the Difference Principle: A Review of the Argument * The "Basic Structure" Objection * The "Basic Structure" Objection: A Preliminary Reply * The "Basic Structure" Objection: A More Fundamental Reply * Who is to Blame? * Coercive and Non-Coercive Social Structures * Appendix I. More on Coercion and the Basic Structure * Appendix II. The Basic Structure is a Structure 4. The Difference Principle * Introduction * Reconsidering the Difference Principle * The Moral Arbitrariness Case for the Difference Principle Contradicts its Content * A Recent Argument for the Difference Principle * A Contractarian Argument for the Difference Principle * What is the Moral Arbitrariness of Talent Differences Supposed to Show? * Chamberlain and Pareto *"Can't" or "Won't" * Human Nature and Constructivism 5. The Freedom Objection * Introduction * Equality, Pareto, and Freedom of Choice of Occupation * Equality, Pareto, and Rawlsian Liberty * Equality, Pareto, and Freedom in Work * The Unequal-Income Inference * Blood, Kidneys, and Sex 6. The Facts * A Statement of my Thesis * Facts, and Some Meta-Ethical Questions * What Most Philosophers Think about Facts and Principles * My Thesis: Ultimate Principles are Fact-Insensitive; and the Clarity of Mind Requirement * An Illustration of the Thesis * More Illustration of the Thesis * The Argument for the Thesis *(i). A Defence of the First Premiss of the Argument *(ii). A Defence of the Second Premiss of the Argument *(iii). A Defence of the Third Premiss of the Argument * Still Further Illustration and Defence of the Thesis * The Clarity of Mind Requirement * The Merely Logical Priority of Fact-Insensitive Principles * The Conditional Character of the Thesis * On "Is" and "Ought" * On "Ought" and "Can" * Possible Misunderstandings of the Thesis * The Thesis is not a Causal Thesis * The Thesis is not a Psychological Thesis * The Thesis is Neutral with Respect to Central Meta-Ethical Disputes * Some Bad Rawlsian Arguments that Reject My Thesis * Utilitarianism, and the Difference Between Fundamental Principles and Rules of Regulation * The Interest of My Thesis * Appendix: God Part Two: Rescuing Justice from... 7. Constructivism * Introduction, and Preliminary Overview * Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism * Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism: Matters Arising * Is Justice the First Virtue of Social Institutions? * Two Illustrations: Social Insurance, Property Taxation * Justice and the Pareto Principle * Justice, and Constraints, Notably Publicity, on Choice of Optimal Rules at Regulation * Justice and Stability * The "Circumstances of Justice" * Conclusion * Appendix: Is the Original Position Justification of Principles Contractarian? 8. The Publicity Argument * Andrew Williams on Publicity and the Egalitarian Ethos * An Anatomy of Williams's Argument * Racism, Justice, and Assurance * Does Assurance Williams-type Determinacy? * Does Justice Require Precision? * Egalitarian Ethi at Home, in the Market, and in the State * Publicity as a Desideratum of Justice * Justice and Occupational Choice * Conclusion General Appendix: Replies to critics * Public and Private Action * The Site of Justice is not Where it Gets Caused * Prior Principles, Self-Respect, and Equality * Incentives and Prerogatives * Pogge's Mastergoals and Supergoals * Pogge's Failure to Address the Standard Case * The Currency of Distributive Justice and Incentive Inequality * Earlier Discussions of Rawls on Incentives