G. A. Cohen was Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University.

With his characteristic brilliance and philosophical depth, G.A. Cohen aims to defend a more pure equality and justice by retrieving them from Rawlsian liberalism. The result is a bracing challenge to contemporary complacency about inequality.

• * Preface * Introduction * The Big Issue * Rescuing Equality and Justice * Some Methodological Disagreements * Justice and Fairness * The Two Standpoints * The Greatness of John Rawls * An Outline of the Book Part One: Rescuing Equality from... 1. The Incentives Argument I. The Incentives Argument, The Interpersonal Test, and Community * Incentives, the Difference Principle, and Equality * Nigel Lawson's Tax Cut * On Uttering Arguments in Variable Interpersonal Settings * The Kidnapper's Argument * Community, and the Interpersonal Test * Does the Incentive Argument Pass the Interpersonal Test? II. Testing the Incentive Argument * What Makes the Minor Premiss of the Incentive Argument True? * Why the Incentive Argument Fails the Interpersonal Test * The Incentive Argument and Bad Faith * Should the Poor Reject the Incentive Argument? * First Persons and Third Persons III. Incentives and the Difference Principle * Strict and Lax Readings of the Difference Principle * Why Just People Must Practise the Strict Difference Principle * The Difference Principle and "Daily Life" * Dignity, Fraternity, and The Difference Principle * The Difference Principle and "Mutual Indifference" * The Difference Principle and the Unjust Society 2. The Pareto Argument for Inequality * Introduction * The Argument Expounded * The Argument Challenged * The Argument Rejected * Labour Burden in the Metric of Equality * Inconsistent Metrics * Raising the Baseline * Impartiality and Mutual Advantage * Inequality: A Necessary Evil? * Conclusion 3. The Basic Structure Objection *"The Personal is Political" * Incentives and the Difference Principle: A Review of the Argument * The "Basic Structure" Objection * The "Basic Structure" Objection: A Preliminary Reply * The "Basic Structure" Objection: A More Fundamental Reply * Who is to Blame? * Coercive and Non-Coercive Social Structures * Appendix I. More on Coercion and the Basic Structure * Appendix II. The Basic Structure is a Structure 4. The Difference Principle * Introduction * Reconsidering the Difference Principle * The Moral Arbitrariness Case for the Difference Principle Contradicts its Content * A Recent Argument for the Difference Principle * A Contractarian Argument for the Difference Principle * What is the Moral Arbitrariness of Talent Differences Supposed to Show? * Chamberlain and Pareto *"Can't" or "Won't" * Human Nature and Constructivism 5. The Freedom Objection * Introduction * Equality, Pareto, and Freedom of Choice of Occupation * Equality, Pareto, and Rawlsian Liberty * Equality, Pareto, and Freedom in Work * The Unequal-Income Inference * Blood, Kidneys, and Sex 6. The Facts * A Statement of my Thesis * Facts, and Some Meta-Ethical Questions * What Most Philosophers Think about Facts and Principles * My Thesis: Ultimate Principles are Fact-Insensitive; and the Clarity of Mind Requirement * An Illustration of the Thesis * More Illustration of the Thesis * The Argument for the Thesis *(i). A Defence of the First Premiss of the Argument *(ii). A Defence of the Second Premiss of the Argument *(iii). A Defence of the Third Premiss of the Argument * Still Further Illustration and Defence of the Thesis * The Clarity of Mind Requirement * The Merely Logical Priority of Fact-Insensitive Principles * The Conditional Character of the Thesis * On "Is" and "Ought" * On "Ought" and "Can" * Possible Misunderstandings of the Thesis * The Thesis is not a Causal Thesis * The Thesis is not a Psychological Thesis * The Thesis is Neutral with Respect to Central Meta-Ethical Disputes * Some Bad Rawlsian Arguments that Reject My Thesis * Utilitarianism, and the Difference Between Fundamental Principles and Rules of Regulation * The Interest of My Thesis * Appendix: God Part Two: Rescuing Justice from... 7. Constructivism * Introduction, and Preliminary Overview * Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism * Fundamental Principles of Justice and Constructivism: Matters Arising * Is Justice the First Virtue of Social Institutions? * Two Illustrations: Social Insurance, Property Taxation * Justice and the Pareto Principle * Justice, and Constraints, Notably Publicity, on Choice of Optimal Rules at Regulation * Justice and Stability * The "Circumstances of Justice" * Conclusion * Appendix: Is the Original Position Justification of Principles Contractarian? 8. The Publicity Argument * Andrew Williams on Publicity and the Egalitarian Ethos * An Anatomy of Williams's Argument * Racism, Justice, and Assurance * Does Assurance Williams-type Determinacy? * Does Justice Require Precision? * Egalitarian Ethi at Home, in the Market, and in the State * Publicity as a Desideratum of Justice * Justice and Occupational Choice * Conclusion General Appendix: Replies to critics * Public and Private Action * The Site of Justice is not Where it Gets Caused * Prior Principles, Self-Respect, and Equality * Incentives and Prerogatives * Pogge's Mastergoals and Supergoals * Pogge's Failure to Address the Standard Case * The Currency of Distributive Justice and Incentive Inequality * Earlier Discussions of Rawls on Incentives