William A. Fischel is Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College.

In this rich volume, Fischel critically assesses the central debates on the regulatory infringement of property rights, the adjudication of disputes surrounding regulatory takings, and the weighing of key values that should be addressed in the process...Fischel takes the reader through a fascinating set of arguments and debates...Regulatory Takings is a fine contribution to the literature. It is logically arranged, coherently argued, and written with flair and humor...Fischel's book [is] likely to assume a place next to other classics in the field and shape future discussions of the takings issue. This volume should be widely read by scholars of public law, law and economics, regulation, and public policy.

• Preface Introduction 1. Of Coase and Coal: Regulatory Takings in the U.S. Supreme Court 2. Eminent Domain's Democratic Origins and Economics Cycles 3. Constitutional Law, Process Theory, and Democratic Commitment 4. The Economic-Utilitarian Theories of Michelman and Esptein 5. Rational Expectations and Contractarian Conventions 6. Capitalizing on Land Use Regulation: Evidence from California 7. Zoning, Capitalization, and The Efficiency of Local Government 8. How Exit and Voice Discipline Government Excess 9. Remedies for Unfair Land Use Restrictions and Exactions Case References General References Index

William A. Fischel is Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College.

In this rich volume, Fischel critically assesses the central debates on the regulatory infringement of property rights, the adjudication of disputes surrounding regulatory takings, and the weighing of key values that should be addressed in the process...Fischel takes the reader through a fascinating set of arguments and debates...Regulatory Takings is a fine contribution to the literature. It is logically arranged, coherently argued, and written with flair and humor...Fischel's book [is] likely to assume a place next to other classics in the field and shape future discussions of the takings issue. This volume should be widely read by scholars of public law, law and economics, regulation, and public policy.

• Preface Introduction 1. Of Coase and Coal: Regulatory Takings in the U.S. Supreme Court 2. Eminent Domain's Democratic Origins and Economics Cycles 3. Constitutional Law, Process Theory, and Democratic Commitment 4. The Economic-Utilitarian Theories of Michelman and Esptein 5. Rational Expectations and Contractarian Conventions 6. Capitalizing on Land Use Regulation: Evidence from California 7. Zoning, Capitalization, and The Efficiency of Local Government 8. How Exit and Voice Discipline Government Excess 9. Remedies for Unfair Land Use Restrictions and Exactions Case References General References Index