Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements

Edward D. Mansfield is the Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Helen V. Milner is the B. C. Forbes Professor of Public Affairs at Princeton University.

"[T]heirs is a magnificent book, among the most provocative written on the subject... Nobody interested in the political economy of trade can ignore this book. Without question, it will be widely read and cited, as it deserves to be."--Kerry A. Chase, Review of International Organizations "Votes, Vetoes and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements ... stands as the most comprehensive modern treatment of the domestic political economy of trade agreements. It is essential reading for economists, political scientists, and policy analysts interested in the trade agreements and the evolution of the international trade system."--Pravin Krishna, Journal of Economic Literature "Overall, this is a highly compelling book that deserves a wide readership. The authors managed to anticipate and defuse many potential objections to their argument. Moreover, the empirical examination serves as a model of excellent research."--Andreas Dur, Perspectives on Politics

• List of Figures and Tables vii Preface and Acknowledgments ix Commonly Used Abbreviations xi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 What Are PTAs and Why Are They Important? 5 Economic Effects of PTAs 7 Political and Security Effects of PTAs 8 PTAs in Historical Perspective 9 The Effects of Domestic Politics on PTAs: The Argument in Brief 14 The Broader Theoretical Context 19 Organization of the Book 21 Chapter 2: A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements 23 A Political Economy Theory of PTAs 24 Examining the Assumptions Underlying the Theory 30 An Alternative Argument about PTAs and Domestic Politics: The Role of Interest Groups 37 Regime Type, Domestic Political Costs, and PTAs 41 Two Cases of Democracy and PTA Formation: SADC and Mercosur 45 Veto Players, Transaction Costs, and PTAs 55 Some Illustrations of the Effects of Veto Players on PTA Formation 58 Further Effects of Domestic Politics on International Trade Agreements: Auxiliary Hypotheses 63 Conclusion 68 Chapter 3: Systemic Influences on PTA Formation 70 International Influences on PTA Formation 71 The Models and Estimation Procedures 77 Estimates of the Parameters 83 The GATT/WTO and PTA Formation 88 Conclusions 90 Chapter 4: Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation 93 Two Theoretical Propositions 93 Empirical Tests of the Hypotheses 96 Results of the Empirical Analysis 104 Robustness Checks 113 Conclusions 121 Chapter 5: Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements 122 PTAs and the Longevity of Political Leaders 124 Partisanship and PTAs 128 Regime Type and Exposure to the International Economy 129 Autocracies, Political Competition, and PTAs 132 The Extent of Proposed Integration and Enforcement 137 Ratification Delay and Veto Players 145 Conclusions 151 Chapter 6: Conclusions 155 The Argument and Evidence in Brief 156 Some Implications for the Study of International Relations 161 PTAs and the World Economy 171 PTAs and the International Political Economy: Power and Politics 174 Bibliography 179 Index 201