Knowing the Adversary

Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations

AvKeren Yarhi-Milo

Häftad, Engelska, 2014

Del i serien Princeton Studies in International History and Politics

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Beskrivning

States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework--called selective attention--that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do.Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries. Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2014-07-21
Mått:152 x 235 x 23 mm
Vikt:482 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Princeton Studies in International History and Politics
Antal sidor:368
Förlag:Princeton University Press
ISBN:9780691159164
Utmärkelser:Winner of Edgar S. Furniss Book Award 2014

Utforska kategorier

Internationella relationer inom Samhälle och politik

Mer om författaren

Keren Yarhi-Milo is assistant professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University.

Recensioner i media

Co-Winner of the 2016 DPLST Book Prize, Diplomatic Studies Section of the International Studies Association Winner, 2014 Edgar S. Furniss Book Award, Mershon Center for International Security Studies "[Knowing the Adversary] enriches the debate over the best way for policymakers and analysts to filter the vast pools of information they gather about rivals."--Foreign Affairs "[A] solid scholarly book...The major contribution of the book is the systematic focus on a notoriously amorphous subject--how world leaders and intelligence organizations draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions."--Choice "Knowing the Adversary is a great success: it is thoroughly researched, well written, convincing in its conclusions, and rich in policy implications of the highest security importance."--Mark L. Haas, Political Science Quarterly

Innehållsförteckning

Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Theories of Intentions and the Problem of Attention 14 Chapter 2 I ndicators of Nazi Germany's Intentions and the Coming of World War II, 1934-39 44 Chapter 3 British Decision Makers' Perceptions of Nazi Germany's Intentions 58 Chapter 4 The British Intelligence Community's Assessments of Nazi Germany's Intentions 102 Chapter 5 The Carter Era and the Collapse of Detente, 1977-80 114 Chapter 6 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Detente 126 Chapter 7 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The Collapse of Detente 158 Chapter 8 I ndicators of Soviet Intentions and the End of the Cold War, 1985-88 178 Chapter 9 US Decision Makers' Perceptions of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War 192 Chapter 10 The US Intelligence Community's Assessments of Soviet Intentions: The End of the Cold War 224 Chapter 11 S ummary and Implications 241 Appendix: Summary of Hypotheses 255 Notes 259 Index 345