Keren Yarhi-Milo – författare

States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework--called selective attention--that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do.Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries. Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security.

Combining decades of diplomacy and world-renowned scholarship, Inside the Situation Room bridges the gap between politics and academia to illuminate how world leaders make decisions in times of crisis. For decades, people have sought to understand how and why decisions are made in times of crisis, but very few get the opportunity to witness leaders' decision-making process. The result has been a persistent disconnect between the theory and the practice of decision-making. Now, a former US Secretary of State has joined forces with a world-renowned scholar to bridge that gap, first in their ground-breaking class at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, and now in the pages of this book. In Inside the Situation Room, Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton and Dr. Keren Yarhi-Milo bring together insights from more than a dozen leading policymakers and scholars so readers can experience a masterclass in global policy and crisis decision-making. The book includes everything from the psychology and mechanics of threat assessment; the role of advisors; the effects of group think and trust; real-life stories of diplomatic efforts and covert operations; and the impact of public opinion. Inside the Situation Room offers an insider look at how decisions are actually made, what theoretical insights might be useful to current and future generations of leaders, and where research still needs to be done. This book will serve as the first step toward a new standard engagement: more active, iterative collaboration among two communities--scholars and practitioners--who have a great deal to contribute and learn from one another.

Combining decades of diplomacy and world-renowned scholarship, Inside the Situation Room bridges the gap between politics and academia to illuminate how world leaders make decisions in times of crisis. For decades, people have sought to understand how and why decisions are made in times of crisis, but very few get the opportunity to witness leaders' decision-making process. The result has been a persistent disconnect between the theory and the practice of decision-making. Now, a former US Secretary of State has joined forces with a world-renowned scholar to bridge that gap, first in their ground-breaking class at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, and now in the pages of this book. In Inside the Situation Room, Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton and Dr. Keren Yarhi-Milo bring together insights from more than a dozen leading policymakers and scholars so readers can experience a masterclass in global policy and crisis decision-making. The book includes everything from the psychology and mechanics of threat assessment; the role of advisors; the effects of group think and trust; real-life stories of diplomatic efforts and covert operations; how women have shaped decisions over peace and security; and the impact of public opinion. Inside the Situation Room offers an insider look at how decisions are actually made, what theoretical insights might be useful to current and future generations of leaders, and where research still needs to be done. This book will serve as the first step toward a new standard engagement: more active, iterative collaboration among two communities scholars and practitioners who have a great deal to contribute and learn from one another.

Combining decades of diplomacy and world-renowned scholarship, Inside the Situation Room bridges the gap between politics and academia to illuminate how world leaders make decisions in times of crisis. For decades, people have sought to understand how and why decisions are made in times of crisis, but very few get the opportunity to witness leaders' decision-making process. The result has been a persistent disconnect between the theory and the practice of decision-making. Now, a former US Secretary of State has joined forces with a world-renowned scholar to bridge that gap, first in their ground-breaking class at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, and now in the pages of this book. In Inside the Situation Room, Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton and Dr. Keren Yarhi-Milo bring together insights from more than a dozen leading policymakers and scholars so readers can experience a masterclass in global policy and crisis decision-making. The book includes everything from the psychology and mechanics of threat assessment; the role of advisors; the effects of group think and trust; real-life stories of diplomatic efforts and covert operations; how women have shaped decisions over peace and security; and the impact of public opinion. Inside the Situation Room offers an insider look at how decisions are actually made, what theoretical insights might be useful to current and future generations of leaders, and where research still needs to be done. This book will serve as the first step toward a new standard engagement: more active, iterative collaboration among two communities scholars and practitioners who have a great deal to contribute and learn from one another.

States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework--called selective attention--that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do.Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries. Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security.

How psychology explains why a leader is willing to use military force to protect or salvage reputationIn Who Fights for Reputation, Keren Yarhi-Milo provides an original framework, based on insights from psychology, to explain why some political leaders are more willing to use military force to defend their reputation than others. Rather than focusing on a leader's background, beliefs, bargaining skills, or biases, Yarhi-Milo draws a systematic link between a trait called self-monitoring and foreign policy behavior. She examines self-monitoring among national leaders and advisers and shows that while high self-monitors modify their behavior strategically to cultivate image-enhancing status, low self-monitors are less likely to change their behavior in response to reputation concerns.Exploring self-monitoring through case studies of foreign policy crises during the terms of U.S. presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, Yarhi-Milo disproves the notion that hawks are always more likely than doves to fight for reputation. Instead, Yarhi-Milo demonstrates that a decision maker's propensity for impression management is directly associated with the use of force to restore a reputation for resolve on the international stage.Who Fights for Reputation offers a brand-new understanding of the pivotal influence that psychological factors have on political leadership, military engagement, and the protection of public prestige.

How psychology explains why a leader is willing to use military force to protect or salvage reputationIn Who Fights for Reputation, Keren Yarhi-Milo provides an original framework, based on insights from psychology, to explain why some political leaders are more willing to use military force to defend their reputation than others. Rather than focusing on a leader's background, beliefs, bargaining skills, or biases, Yarhi-Milo draws a systematic link between a trait called self-monitoring and foreign policy behavior. She examines self-monitoring among national leaders and advisers and shows that while high self-monitors modify their behavior strategically to cultivate image-enhancing status, low self-monitors are less likely to change their behavior in response to reputation concerns.Exploring self-monitoring through case studies of foreign policy crises during the terms of U.S. presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, Yarhi-Milo disproves the notion that hawks are always more likely than doves to fight for reputation. Instead, Yarhi-Milo demonstrates that a decision maker's propensity for impression management is directly associated with the use of force to restore a reputation for resolve on the international stage.Who Fights for Reputation offers a brand-new understanding of the pivotal influence that psychological factors have on political leadership, military engagement, and the protection of public prestige.