Ethical Argumentation

Douglas Walton holds the Assumption University Chair in Argumentation Studies and is Distinguished Research Fellow of the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric at the University of Windsor.

Ethical Argumentation explains and defends a systematic, imaginative, and highly plausible model of ethical reasoning worthy of the careful attention of anyone interested in moral theory or applied ethics.

• Chapter 1 IntroductionPart 2 Fundamentals of Ethical ArgumentationChapter 3 Legal ArgumentsChapter 4 Hard Cases and Easy CasesChapter 5 Ross's Theory of Ethical ReasoningChapter 6 Comparison of Ethical and Legal ArgumentsChapter 7 The Problem of Emotive LanguageChapter 8 Toward a New FrameworkChapter 9 Aristotle on Endoxic Ethical JustificationChapter 10 Evaluating Ethical Argumentation in a Dialogue FormatChapter 11 Deliberation and Practical ReasoningChapter 12 Concluding PerspectivesPart 13 The Layered Maieutic Case Study MethodChapter 14 A Case from Medical EthicsChapter 15 The Layer of DeliberationChapter 16 Dialectical ShiftsChapter 17 The Layer of Critical DiscussionChapter 18 Maieutic Insight and CommitmentChapter 19 The Case Analysis and DiscussionChapter 20 The Structure of a Layered Case StudyChapter 21 Current Status of Casuistry in EthicsChapter 22 How to Evaluate a Layered Case StudyChapter 23 Summary of the Layered Maieutic Case Study MethodPart 24 The Central Characteristics of Ethical ReasoningChapter 25 The Problem of Circular Ethical JustificationChapter 26 Ethical and Legal Reasoning ReconsideredChapter 27 Chained Inferences in Retrospective Ethical ReasoningChapter 28 Deep Disagreements and Ultimate Ethical PremisesChapter 29 Facts and Values in Ethical ReasoningChapter 30 Abductive InferenceChapter 31 Endoxic PremisesChapter 32 How to Determine Endoxic PremisesChapter 33 Summary of the Structure of Ethical ReasoningPart 34 Persuasive DefinitionsChapter 35 Stevenson's Theory of Persuasive DefinitionsChapter 36 Public Policy Implications of Persuasive DefinitionsChapter 37 Value-Laden Terms and Moral PersuasionChapter 38 A Pragmatic Approach to DefinitionsChapter 39 Use of Loaded TermsChapter 40 The Deceptive Aspect of Persuasive DefinitionsChapter 41 Is There a Fallacy of Loaded Terms?Chapter 42 How to Evaluate a Persuasive DefinitionChapter 43 Uses in Other ContextsPart 44 Dialectic, Persuasion, and RhetoricChapter 45 What is Dialectic?Chapter 46 The New DialecticChapter 47 The General Idea of Persuasion DialogueChapter 48 Critical Discussion and Rational PersuasionChapter 49 Fallacies and Faults of ArgumentsChapter 50 The Maieutic Function and Learning What Your Goals AreChapter 51 The Opposition between Rhetoric and DialecticChapter 52 Persuasion, Action, and Ethical JustificationChapter 53 A New Program for Studying Ethical ArgumentationPart 54 The Probative FunctionChapter 55 The Probative Function and Circular ArgumentsChapter 56 Account of the Probative Function in Sextus EmpiricusChapter 57 The Problem of Circular Reasoning as Treated in Ancient SourcesChapter 58 Infinite Regress ArgumentsChapter 59 Types of ArgumentsChapter 60 Linked and Convergent ArgumentsChapter 61 Chaining of ArgumentsChapter 62 Doubt Reduction and ChainingChapter 63 The Importance of the Probative FunctionChapter 64 Summary: How the Probative Function WorksPart 65 The New System of Layered JustificationChapter 66 Subjective and ObjectiveChapter 67 Attitudes, Emotions, and RationalityChapter 68 Evidence, Emotion, and Ethical JustificationChapter 69 Emotivism, Relativism, and PostmodernismChapter 70 The Dialectical Shift to a Verbal DisputeChapter 71 Multiple Definitions of Ethical TermsChapter 72 An Argumentation System for Ethical DefinitionsChapter 73 The Difference between Layered Ethical Justification and PropagandaChapter 74 Summary of the Argumentation SystemChapter 75 The Pragmatic Nature of Ethical Argumentation