Intelligence and the National Security Strategist

Roger Z. George has recently joined the Sherman Kent Center, part of the CIA University's Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. He completed a 3-year teaching assignment at the National War College, where he served as the DCI's Faculty Representative from 2001-2004. Dr. George has been a career intelligence analyst at CIA for 25 years and is a member of the Senior Analytic Service (SAS). He has also served as a Policy Planning Staff member in the Department of State from 1989-91, was the National Intelligence Officer for Europe from 1991-1995, and was the Director of the Policy and Analysis Group for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, from 1995-1997. Dr. George received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from Occidental College in 1971 and his Ph.D in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1977. He has taught International Politics at Brandeis University, Occidental College, UC Santa Cruz and was a post-doctoral research fellow at Stanford University prior to government service.Robert D. Kline is currently working as an independent consultant after recently retiring from the U.S. Department of Defense, where he served for more than 25 years as a senior executive. He was on the faculty of the National Defense University from 2000-2003, and taught in the Department of National Security Strategy at the National War College. Prior to serving at the Department of Defense, Mr. Kline was a senior analyst at the U.S. General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, where he also served on the staff of a Member of Congress. Mr. Kline is a native of Washington, D.C. His undergraduate work was in Political Science and History at the University of Maryland, College Park, and he holds graduate degrees from both the University of Maryland and Johns Hopkins University. He is also a graduate of the Federal Executive Institute.

An extraordinarily rich collection, covering almost every topic likely to be featured in any college, graduate, or professional school course concerning intelligence.

• Chapter 1 ForewordChapter 2 Introduction: Teaching IntelligencePart 3 I Intelligence and the StrategistChapter 4 1 Clausewitz on IntelligenceChapter 5 2 Clausewitz's Contempt for IntelligencePart 6 II Origins and Future of U.S. IntelligenceChapter 7 3 Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency: "Those Spooky Boys"Chapter 8 4 Central Intelligence: Origin and EvolutionChapter 9 5 The Need to Reorganize the Intelligence CommunityPart 10 III Intelligence and DemocracyChapter 11 6 Balancing Liberty and SecurityChapter 12 7 Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of IntelligenceChapter 13 8 Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence OversightChapter 14 9 The Role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in National SecurityPart 15 IV Challenges of Technical CollectionChapter 16 10 Space-Based Surveillance: Reconnaissance Satellites Are a National Security Sine Qua NonChapter 17 11 Unclassified Space EyesChapter 18 12 Commercial Satellite Imagery Comes of AgeChapter 19 13 "John, How Should We Explain MASINT?"Chapter 20 14 The Time of Troubles: The U.S. National Security Agency in the 21st CenturyPart 21 V The Art of Clandestine CollectionChapter 22 15 The In-Culture of the DOChapter 23 16 Espionage in an Age of Change: Optimizing Strategic Intelligence Services for the FutureChapter 24 17 Economic EspionageChapter 25 18 The Ten Commandments of CounterintelligenceChapter 26 19 A Review of the FBI's Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activites of Aldrich Hazen AmesPart 27 VI The Open-Source RevolutionChapter 28 20 Open-Source Intelligence: New Myths, New RealitiesChapter 29 21 The Strategic Use of Open-Source InformationChapter 30 22 Open-Source Intelligence: A Review EssayPart 31 VII Challenges of Intelligence AnalysisChapter 32 23 Defining the Analytic Mission: Facts, Findings, Forecasts, and FortunetellingChapter 33 24 The Challenge for the Political AnalystChapter 34 25 Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mindsets: Alternative AnalysisChapter 35 26 The Intelligence Community Case Method Program: A National Intelligence Estimate on YugoslaviaChapter 36 27 Building Leverage in the Long War: Ensuring Intelligence Community Creativity in the Fight Against TerrorismPart 37 VIII Deception, Denial, and Disclosure ProblemsChapter 38 28 Intelligence and DeceptionChapter 39 29 Miscalculation, Surprise, and U.S. IntelligenceChapter 40 30 How Leaks of Classified Intelligence Help U.S. Adversaries: Implications for Laws and SecrecyPart 41 IX Perils of Policy SupportChapter 42 31 What to Do When Traditional Models FailChapter 43 32 What We Should Demand from IntelligenceChapter 44 33 American Presidents and Their Intelligence CommunitiesChapter 45 34 Inside the White House Situation RoomPart 46 X Intelligence and the MilitaryChapter 47 35 The DCI and the Eight-Hundred-Pound GorillaChapter 48 36 Tug of War: The CIA's Uneasy Relationship with the MilitaryChapter 49 37 CIA Support to Enduring FreedomChapter 50 38 Working with the CIAChapter 51 39 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Forces: Covert WarriorsChapter 52 Appendix A The National Security Act: ExcerptsChapter 53 Appendix B Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence ActivitesChapter 54 Appendix C Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1Chapter 55 Appendix D The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch