What happens to policies when a president dies in office? Do they get replaced bythe new president, or do advisers carry on with the status quo? In November 1963,these were important questions for a Kennedy-turned-Johnson administration.Among these officials was a driven National Security Council staffer named RobertKomer, who had made it his personal mission to have the United States form betterrelations with Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser after diplomatic relations were nearlysevered during the Eisenhower years. While Kennedy saw the benefit of having good,personal relations with the most influential leader in the Middle East—believingthat it was the key to preventing a new front in the global Cold War—Johnsondid not share his predecessor’s enthusiasm for influencing Nasser with aid.In US-Egypt Diplomacy under Johnson, Glickman brings to light the diplomaticefforts of Komer, a masterful strategist at navigating the bureaucraticprocess. Appealing to scholars of Middle Eastern history and US foreignpolicy, the book reveals a new perspective on the path to a war that wasto change the face of the Middle East, and provides an important “appliedhistory” case study for policymakers on the limits of personal diplomacy.
