Few historians have looked beyond the veil of the Teapot Dome scandal and examined the naval policies of President Warren Harding and his secretary of navy, Edwin Denby. Historians have also periodically overlooked the personal papers and archives of the Harding administration as it bears on U.S. naval policy. However, Professor Manley R. Irwin brings forth an innovative approach to researching these policies, papers, and archives in Silent Strategists. The book boldly brings forth the argument that Harding and Denby exercised unusual foresight in preparing the navy for a war against Japan. Both individuals promulgated structural changes in the department and adopted a set of management tools that would redound to the navy in its prosecution of its Pacific offensive, World War II. The administrative legacy of the Harding administration remains as vital today as it did eight decades ago, and Professor Irwin's thorough investigation provides invaluable new details and insights.
