Christina Erneling is Professor of Philosophy at York University, Toronto.

"The schism in cognitive science between those who follow the computer model and those who think language is enough in itself is widening. This book is timely and may sway some of the doubters."I particularly liked the way that the author focussed on Fodor's exemplary version of the 'language of thought' thesis. Also, it cannot be emphasized enough that Wittgenstein's account of all normative practices requires that there be natural or trained regularities in place before linguistic or other normative practices can be acquired. The consequential step that Wittgenstein makes, of developing a psychology of skills, is well brought out. The book is not only a contribution to the field of developmental psycholinguistics, but to Wittgenstein scholarship." — Rom Harré, Oxford and Georgetown Universities

• Acknowledgments Introduction Chapter 1 Learning: Going Beyond Information Given The Two Problems of Learning: Productivity and the Framework Historical Attempts to Solve the Problems of Learning Contemporary Solutions: Skinner, Chomsky, Fodor, and Wittgenstein The Problem of the Meaningfulness of the Framework: Wittgenstein Communication The Domestication Model of Learning and Productivity Summary of the Book Chapter 2 Fodor's Theory of Learning The Problem Situation The Nature of the Framework: Fodor's Theory of Mind The Productivity of Mental Processes The Computational Nature of the Mind The Language of Thought The Semantics of the Language of Thought Fodor's Strong Preformist Thesis Fodor's Theory of Learning Conclusion: The Myth of Learning Chapter 3 Problems with Fodor's Account of Learning Is the Theory Empirical or A Priori? Fodor Confuses the Description with What It Describes Learning as Computation Can the Language of Thought Hypothesis Really Explain Productivity? Are Fodor's Basic Assumptions Tenable? Fodor's Strong Preformist Thesis Is the Language of Thought Intrinsically Meaningful? The Language of Thought and the Following of Rules Learning as Translation Is Fodor's Theory the Only "Remotely Plausible Theory"? Conclusion Chapter 4 Wittgenstein 1: Background and the Rejection of a Language of Thought The Problem Situation Introduction Two Problems of Learning Problem 1: The Problem of Productivity Problem 2: The Problem of the Framework Does Wittgenstein Have a Theory of Learning at All? Description, not Explanation Conclusion: The Connection between Meaning and Learning Wittgenstein and the Language of Thought Relationship between Early and Later Philosophy Tractatus and the Language of Thought Rejection of the Language of Thought Thesis of Tractatus Criticism of Image- and Act-Psychology Chapter 5 Wittgenstein 2: Learning is Not Based on the Language of Thought Rejection of the "Augustinian-Type Account of Learning" The Problem of the Framework Ostensive Definition Understanding or Grasping Translation as Reading The Private Language Argument Thinking The Problem of Productivity Rule Following Conclusion: A Wittgensteinian Criticism of Fodor Chapter 6 Wittgenstein 3: Reconstructing a Wittgensteinian Account of Learning Introduction The Problem Learning as Ostensive Teaching Learning as Apprenticeship Learning as Operant Conditioning Was Wittgenstein a Behaviorist? Learning as Adaptation Natural Forms of Life: The Starting Point for Learning Resemblance between Wittgenstein and Piaget Learning How to Speak The Necessity of Examples, Imitation, and Playing Training and Therapy The Limits of Learning Conclusion Fodor's Criticism of Wittgenstein Problems with Wittgenstein's Account Chapter 7 The Domestication Model of Language Acquisition Introduction The Domestication Model Is Language Species-Specific? The Brain Speech Perception Speech Production Anatomy Voluntary Control and Automatization Syntactical Skills Semantical Skills Imitation Play Communicative-Social Skills: The Acquisition of Language Games Introduction Symbiosis Peekaboo Conclusion Cross-modal Transfer of Skills Later Learning Language and Thought Concluding Remarks Chapter 8 Conclusion: The Framework and Productivity of Learning Introduction Is the Domestication Model an Improvement over Other Theories? The Problem of Productivity The Problem of the Framework "Knowing How" and "Knowing That" The Evolution of Language The Framework and Productivity The Content of the Framework Is the Domestication Model an Explanatory Theory Is the Domestication Model Only a Redescription? Concluding Remarks Conclusion: Genes and Jeans Notes Bibliography Index

Christina Erneling is Professor of Philosophy at York University, Toronto.

"The schism in cognitive science between those who follow the computer model and those who think language is enough in itself is widening. This book is timely and may sway some of the doubters."I particularly liked the way that the author focussed on Fodor's exemplary version of the 'language of thought' thesis. Also, it cannot be emphasized enough that Wittgenstein's account of all normative practices requires that there be natural or trained regularities in place before linguistic or other normative practices can be acquired. The consequential step that Wittgenstein makes, of developing a psychology of skills, is well brought out. The book is not only a contribution to the field of developmental psycholinguistics, but to Wittgenstein scholarship." — Rom Harré, Oxford and Georgetown Universities

• Acknowledgments Introduction Chapter 1 Learning: Going Beyond Information Given The Two Problems of Learning: Productivity and the Framework Historical Attempts to Solve the Problems of Learning Contemporary Solutions: Skinner, Chomsky, Fodor, and Wittgenstein The Problem of the Meaningfulness of the Framework: Wittgenstein Communication The Domestication Model of Learning and Productivity Summary of the Book Chapter 2 Fodor's Theory of Learning The Problem Situation The Nature of the Framework: Fodor's Theory of Mind The Productivity of Mental Processes The Computational Nature of the Mind The Language of Thought The Semantics of the Language of Thought Fodor's Strong Preformist Thesis Fodor's Theory of Learning Conclusion: The Myth of Learning Chapter 3 Problems with Fodor's Account of Learning Is the Theory Empirical or A Priori? Fodor Confuses the Description with What It Describes Learning as Computation Can the Language of Thought Hypothesis Really Explain Productivity? Are Fodor's Basic Assumptions Tenable? Fodor's Strong Preformist Thesis Is the Language of Thought Intrinsically Meaningful? The Language of Thought and the Following of Rules Learning as Translation Is Fodor's Theory the Only "Remotely Plausible Theory"? Conclusion Chapter 4 Wittgenstein 1: Background and the Rejection of a Language of Thought The Problem Situation Introduction Two Problems of Learning Problem 1: The Problem of Productivity Problem 2: The Problem of the Framework Does Wittgenstein Have a Theory of Learning at All? Description, not Explanation Conclusion: The Connection between Meaning and Learning Wittgenstein and the Language of Thought Relationship between Early and Later Philosophy Tractatus and the Language of Thought Rejection of the Language of Thought Thesis of Tractatus Criticism of Image- and Act-Psychology Chapter 5 Wittgenstein 2: Learning is Not Based on the Language of Thought Rejection of the "Augustinian-Type Account of Learning" The Problem of the Framework Ostensive Definition Understanding or Grasping Translation as Reading The Private Language Argument Thinking The Problem of Productivity Rule Following Conclusion: A Wittgensteinian Criticism of Fodor Chapter 6 Wittgenstein 3: Reconstructing a Wittgensteinian Account of Learning Introduction The Problem Learning as Ostensive Teaching Learning as Apprenticeship Learning as Operant Conditioning Was Wittgenstein a Behaviorist? Learning as Adaptation Natural Forms of Life: The Starting Point for Learning Resemblance between Wittgenstein and Piaget Learning How to Speak The Necessity of Examples, Imitation, and Playing Training and Therapy The Limits of Learning Conclusion Fodor's Criticism of Wittgenstein Problems with Wittgenstein's Account Chapter 7 The Domestication Model of Language Acquisition Introduction The Domestication Model Is Language Species-Specific? The Brain Speech Perception Speech Production Anatomy Voluntary Control and Automatization Syntactical Skills Semantical Skills Imitation Play Communicative-Social Skills: The Acquisition of Language Games Introduction Symbiosis Peekaboo Conclusion Cross-modal Transfer of Skills Later Learning Language and Thought Concluding Remarks Chapter 8 Conclusion: The Framework and Productivity of Learning Introduction Is the Domestication Model an Improvement over Other Theories? The Problem of Productivity The Problem of the Framework "Knowing How" and "Knowing That" The Evolution of Language The Framework and Productivity The Content of the Framework Is the Domestication Model an Explanatory Theory Is the Domestication Model Only a Redescription? Concluding Remarks Conclusion: Genes and Jeans Notes Bibliography Index

Christina Erneling is Professor of Philosophy at York University, Toronto.

"The schism in cognitive science between those who follow the computer model and those who think language is enough in itself is widening. This book is timely and may sway some of the doubters."I particularly liked the way that the author focussed on Fodor's exemplary version of the 'language of thought' thesis. Also, it cannot be emphasized enough that Wittgenstein's account of all normative practices requires that there be natural or trained regularities in place before linguistic or other normative practices can be acquired. The consequential step that Wittgenstein makes, of developing a psychology of skills, is well brought out. The book is not only a contribution to the field of developmental psycholinguistics, but to Wittgenstein scholarship." — Rom Harré, Oxford and Georgetown Universities

• Acknowledgments Introduction Chapter 1 Learning: Going Beyond Information Given The Two Problems of Learning: Productivity and the Framework Historical Attempts to Solve the Problems of Learning Contemporary Solutions: Skinner, Chomsky, Fodor, and Wittgenstein The Problem of the Meaningfulness of the Framework: Wittgenstein Communication The Domestication Model of Learning and Productivity Summary of the Book Chapter 2 Fodor's Theory of Learning The Problem Situation The Nature of the Framework: Fodor's Theory of Mind The Productivity of Mental Processes The Computational Nature of the Mind The Language of Thought The Semantics of the Language of Thought Fodor's Strong Preformist Thesis Fodor's Theory of Learning Conclusion: The Myth of Learning Chapter 3 Problems with Fodor's Account of Learning Is the Theory Empirical or A Priori? Fodor Confuses the Description with What It Describes Learning as Computation Can the Language of Thought Hypothesis Really Explain Productivity? Are Fodor's Basic Assumptions Tenable? Fodor's Strong Preformist Thesis Is the Language of Thought Intrinsically Meaningful? The Language of Thought and the Following of Rules Learning as Translation Is Fodor's Theory the Only "Remotely Plausible Theory"? Conclusion Chapter 4 Wittgenstein 1: Background and the Rejection of a Language of Thought The Problem Situation Introduction Two Problems of Learning Problem 1: The Problem of Productivity Problem 2: The Problem of the Framework Does Wittgenstein Have a Theory of Learning at All? Description, not Explanation Conclusion: The Connection between Meaning and Learning Wittgenstein and the Language of Thought Relationship between Early and Later Philosophy Tractatus and the Language of Thought Rejection of the Language of Thought Thesis of Tractatus Criticism of Image- and Act-Psychology Chapter 5 Wittgenstein 2: Learning is Not Based on the Language of Thought Rejection of the "Augustinian-Type Account of Learning" The Problem of the Framework Ostensive Definition Understanding or Grasping Translation as Reading The Private Language Argument Thinking The Problem of Productivity Rule Following Conclusion: A Wittgensteinian Criticism of Fodor Chapter 6 Wittgenstein 3: Reconstructing a Wittgensteinian Account of Learning Introduction The Problem Learning as Ostensive Teaching Learning as Apprenticeship Learning as Operant Conditioning Was Wittgenstein a Behaviorist? Learning as Adaptation Natural Forms of Life: The Starting Point for Learning Resemblance between Wittgenstein and Piaget Learning How to Speak The Necessity of Examples, Imitation, and Playing Training and Therapy The Limits of Learning Conclusion Fodor's Criticism of Wittgenstein Problems with Wittgenstein's Account Chapter 7 The Domestication Model of Language Acquisition Introduction The Domestication Model Is Language Species-Specific? The Brain Speech Perception Speech Production Anatomy Voluntary Control and Automatization Syntactical Skills Semantical Skills Imitation Play Communicative-Social Skills: The Acquisition of Language Games Introduction Symbiosis Peekaboo Conclusion Cross-modal Transfer of Skills Later Learning Language and Thought Concluding Remarks Chapter 8 Conclusion: The Framework and Productivity of Learning Introduction Is the Domestication Model an Improvement over Other Theories? The Problem of Productivity The Problem of the Framework "Knowing How" and "Knowing That" The Evolution of Language The Framework and Productivity The Content of the Framework Is the Domestication Model an Explanatory Theory Is the Domestication Model Only a Redescription? Concluding Remarks Conclusion: Genes and Jeans Notes Bibliography Index