With the revolutions in Eastern Europe since mid-1989, two main transformations are envisaged: pluralistic political democracy and a market economy based largely on private property and self-interest. One element that straddles those two objectives is what to do with state-owned property during the transition from a planned to a market environment. This work looks at the economic goals that may be pursued in various ways: by taking the state out of the allocation of the service streams of existing capital assets in general and state-owned enterprise in particular. It advocates the urgency of taking politics out of resource allocation. Since this cannot be done through divestment, particularly for large assets, it is imperative that alternatives be put in place at the earliest possible opportunity in the economic transformation. For petty assets (such housing, small shops, handicrafts and restaurants) quick divestment is desirable. For other assets, the principal agent problem will need to be taken care of by investing management with the task of acting in the interest of real owders.

With the revolutions in Eastern Europe since mid-1989, two main transformations are envisaged: pluralistic political democracy and a market economy based largely on private property and self-interest. One element that straddles those two objectives is what to do with state-owned property during the transition from a planned to a market environment. This work looks at the economic goals that may be pursued in various ways: by taking the state out of the allocation of the service streams of existing capital assets in general and state-owned enterprise in particular. It advocates the urgency of taking politics out of resource allocation. Since this cannot be done through divestment, particularly for large assets, it is imperative that alternatives be put in place at the earliest possible opportunity in the economic transformation. For petty assets (such housing, small shops, handicrafts and restaurants) quick divestment is desirable. For other assets, the principal agent problem will need to be taken care of by investing management with the task of acting in the interest of real owders.

With the revolutions in Eastern Europe since mid-1989, two main transformations are envisaged: pluralistic political democracy and a market economy based largely on private property and self-interest. One element that straddles those two objectives is what to do with state-owned property during the transition from a planned to a market environment. This work looks at the economic goals that may be pursued in various ways: by taking the state out of the allocation of the service streams of existing capital assets in general and state-owned enterprise in particular. It advocates the urgency of taking politics out of resource allocation. Since this cannot be done through divestment, particularly for large assets, it is imperative that alternatives be put in place at the earliest possible opportunity in the economic transformation. For petty assets (such housing, small shops, handicrafts and restaurants) quick divestment is desirable. For other assets, the principal agent problem will need to be taken care of by investing management with the task of acting in the interest of real owders.