This text discusses the philosophy of language, focusing on referential uptake, that is, the question of what counts as properly "understanding" a referring act in communication. In this text, the particular line pursued goes back to Strawson's work on re-identification, but the immediate influence is that of Gareth Evans. It is argued that traditional and recent proposals fail to account for success in referential communication. A novel account is developed, resembling Evans' account, in combining an external success condition with a Fregean one. But, in contrast to Evans, greater emphasis is placed on the action-enabling side of communication. Further topics discussed include the role of mental states in accounting for communication, the impact of re-identification on the understanding of referring acts and Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. This text is useful for philosophers, cognitive scientists and semanticists.

This text discusses the philosophy of language, focusing on referential uptake, that is, the question of what counts as properly "understanding" a referring act in communication. In this text, the particular line pursued goes back to Strawson's work on re-identification, but the immediate influence is that of Gareth Evans. It is argued that traditional and recent proposals fail to account for success in referential communication. A novel account is developed, resembling Evans' account, in combining an external success condition with a Fregean one. But, in contrast to Evans, greater emphasis is placed on the action-enabling side of communication. Further topics discussed include the role of mental states in accounting for communication, the impact of re-identification on the understanding of referring acts and Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. This text is useful for philosophers, cognitive scientists and semanticists.

This text discusses the philosophy of language, focusing on referential uptake, that is, the question of what counts as properly "understanding" a referring act in communication. In this text, the particular line pursued goes back to Strawson's work on re-identification, but the immediate influence is that of Gareth Evans. It is argued that traditional and recent proposals fail to account for success in referential communication. A novel account is developed, resembling Evans' account, in combining an external success condition with a Fregean one. But, in contrast to Evans, greater emphasis is placed on the action-enabling side of communication. Further topics discussed include the role of mental states in accounting for communication, the impact of re-identification on the understanding of referring acts and Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. This text is useful for philosophers, cognitive scientists and semanticists.