James M. Goldgeier is director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., USA, where he is associate professor of political science and international affairs. He is also an adjunct senior fellow in Europe studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

"The book will take its rightful place among research volumes that serve as key references for academics and other close students of interstate and intrastate conflict behavior." —Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State University, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 5/1/2001|"Goldgeier's access to a number of key figures involved in the emergence of this policy has clearly provided a number of interesting insights into the policy process.... an impressively detailed account of the emergence of the policy of NATO enlargement within the US policy process." —Richard Morton, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Millennium, 8/1/2001|"An outstanding contribution to the study of US foreign policy and NATO's evolution since the Soviet Union's collapse.... Goldgeier's research is impressive and well-balanced.... readers will gain much from this excellent survey of American foreign policy history." —Ryan C. Hendrickson, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 14:1, 2001|"James M. Goldgeier makes a major contribution to the contemporary case study literature concerning American foreign policy formation.... This book should be a priority for those interested in a detailed, focused case study that reconstructs the complex array of factors in a post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy decision likely to have significant consequences for generations to come." —Sharyl Cross, San Jose State University, American Political Science Review, 3/1/2002|"An informative and insightful account." —Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor|"An informative and insightful account of the internal bureaucratic struggles and of the outside influences that generated the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO." —Zbigniew Brzezinksi, Former National Security Advisor|"This is by far the best account of the controversial decision to enlarge NATO. It is solidly researched, clearly written, persuasively argued, and —most impressively —fair in its treatment of all sides. I can think of no better book to read on the nature of American leadership in the post-Cold War world." —John Lewis Gaddis, Yale University

James M. Goldgeier is director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., USA, where he is associate professor of political science and international affairs. He is also an adjunct senior fellow in Europe studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

"The book will take its rightful place among research volumes that serve as key references for academics and other close students of interstate and intrastate conflict behavior." —Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State University, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 5/1/2001|"Goldgeier's access to a number of key figures involved in the emergence of this policy has clearly provided a number of interesting insights into the policy process.... an impressively detailed account of the emergence of the policy of NATO enlargement within the US policy process." —Richard Morton, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Millennium, 8/1/2001|"An outstanding contribution to the study of US foreign policy and NATO's evolution since the Soviet Union's collapse.... Goldgeier's research is impressive and well-balanced.... readers will gain much from this excellent survey of American foreign policy history." —Ryan C. Hendrickson, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 14:1, 2001|"James M. Goldgeier makes a major contribution to the contemporary case study literature concerning American foreign policy formation.... This book should be a priority for those interested in a detailed, focused case study that reconstructs the complex array of factors in a post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy decision likely to have significant consequences for generations to come." —Sharyl Cross, San Jose State University, American Political Science Review, 3/1/2002|"An informative and insightful account." —Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor|"An informative and insightful account of the internal bureaucratic struggles and of the outside influences that generated the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO." —Zbigniew Brzezinksi, Former National Security Advisor|"This is by far the best account of the controversial decision to enlarge NATO. It is solidly researched, clearly written, persuasively argued, and —most impressively —fair in its treatment of all sides. I can think of no better book to read on the nature of American leadership in the post-Cold War world." —John Lewis Gaddis, Yale University

James M. Goldgeier is director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., USA, where he is associate professor of political science and international affairs. He is also an adjunct senior fellow in Europe studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

"The book will take its rightful place among research volumes that serve as key references for academics and other close students of interstate and intrastate conflict behavior." —Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State University, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 5/1/2001|"Goldgeier's access to a number of key figures involved in the emergence of this policy has clearly provided a number of interesting insights into the policy process.... an impressively detailed account of the emergence of the policy of NATO enlargement within the US policy process." —Richard Morton, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Millennium, 8/1/2001|"An outstanding contribution to the study of US foreign policy and NATO's evolution since the Soviet Union's collapse.... Goldgeier's research is impressive and well-balanced.... readers will gain much from this excellent survey of American foreign policy history." —Ryan C. Hendrickson, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 14:1, 2001|"James M. Goldgeier makes a major contribution to the contemporary case study literature concerning American foreign policy formation.... This book should be a priority for those interested in a detailed, focused case study that reconstructs the complex array of factors in a post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy decision likely to have significant consequences for generations to come." —Sharyl Cross, San Jose State University, American Political Science Review, 3/1/2002|"An informative and insightful account." —Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor|"An informative and insightful account of the internal bureaucratic struggles and of the outside influences that generated the U.S. decision to enlarge NATO." —Zbigniew Brzezinksi, Former National Security Advisor|"This is by far the best account of the controversial decision to enlarge NATO. It is solidly researched, clearly written, persuasively argued, and —most impressively —fair in its treatment of all sides. I can think of no better book to read on the nature of American leadership in the post-Cold War world." —John Lewis Gaddis, Yale University