Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI), professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University, and a contributing editor to The Atlantic. She is also the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where she directs the Robert and Marion Oster National Security Affairs Fellows program. She is founder and co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program.

• Contents:List of Figures and TablesAcknowledgments1. Introduction2. Illuminating a New Domain: The Role and Nature of Military Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Cyberspace3. How Effects, Saliencies, and Norms Should Influence U.S. Cyberwar Doctrine4. A Strategic Assessment of the U.S. Cyber Command Vision5. A Cyber SIOP? Operational Considerations for Strategic Offensive Cyber Planning6. Second Acts in Cyberspace7. Hacking a Nation's Missile Development Program8. The Cartwright Conjecture: The Deterrent Value and Escalatory Risk of Fearsome Cyber Capabilities9. The Cyber Commitment Problem and the Destabilization of Nuclear Deterrence10. Cyber Terrorism: Its Effects on Psychological Well-Being, Public Confidence, and Political Attitudes11. Limiting the Undesired Impact of Cyber Weapons: Technical Requirements and Policy Implications12. Rules of Engagement for Cyberspace Operations: A View from the United States13. U.S. Offensive Cyber Operations in a China-U.S. Military Confrontation14. Disintermediation, Counterinsurgency, and Cyber Defense15. Private Sector Cyber Weapons: An Adequate Response to the Sovereignty Gap?16. Cyberwar Inc.: Examining the Role of Companies in Offensive Cyber OperationsIndexContributors

Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI), professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University, and a contributing editor to The Atlantic. She is also the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where she directs the Robert and Marion Oster National Security Affairs Fellows program. She is founder and co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program.

• Contents:List of Figures and TablesAcknowledgments1. Introduction2. Illuminating a New Domain: The Role and Nature of Military Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Cyberspace3. How Effects, Saliencies, and Norms Should Influence U.S. Cyberwar Doctrine4. A Strategic Assessment of the U.S. Cyber Command Vision5. A Cyber SIOP? Operational Considerations for Strategic Offensive Cyber Planning6. Second Acts in Cyberspace7. Hacking a Nation's Missile Development Program8. The Cartwright Conjecture: The Deterrent Value and Escalatory Risk of Fearsome Cyber Capabilities9. The Cyber Commitment Problem and the Destabilization of Nuclear Deterrence10. Cyber Terrorism: Its Effects on Psychological Well-Being, Public Confidence, and Political Attitudes11. Limiting the Undesired Impact of Cyber Weapons: Technical Requirements and Policy Implications12. Rules of Engagement for Cyberspace Operations: A View from the United States13. U.S. Offensive Cyber Operations in a China-U.S. Military Confrontation14. Disintermediation, Counterinsurgency, and Cyber Defense15. Private Sector Cyber Weapons: An Adequate Response to the Sovereignty Gap?16. Cyberwar Inc.: Examining the Role of Companies in Offensive Cyber OperationsIndexContributors

Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI), professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University, and a contributing editor to The Atlantic. She is also the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where she directs the Robert and Marion Oster National Security Affairs Fellows program. She is founder and co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program.

• Contents:List of Figures and TablesAcknowledgments1. Introduction2. Illuminating a New Domain: The Role and Nature of Military Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Cyberspace3. How Effects, Saliencies, and Norms Should Influence U.S. Cyberwar Doctrine4. A Strategic Assessment of the U.S. Cyber Command Vision5. A Cyber SIOP? Operational Considerations for Strategic Offensive Cyber Planning6. Second Acts in Cyberspace7. Hacking a Nation's Missile Development Program8. The Cartwright Conjecture: The Deterrent Value and Escalatory Risk of Fearsome Cyber Capabilities9. The Cyber Commitment Problem and the Destabilization of Nuclear Deterrence10. Cyber Terrorism: Its Effects on Psychological Well-Being, Public Confidence, and Political Attitudes11. Limiting the Undesired Impact of Cyber Weapons: Technical Requirements and Policy Implications12. Rules of Engagement for Cyberspace Operations: A View from the United States13. U.S. Offensive Cyber Operations in a China-U.S. Military Confrontation14. Disintermediation, Counterinsurgency, and Cyber Defense15. Private Sector Cyber Weapons: An Adequate Response to the Sovereignty Gap?16. Cyberwar Inc.: Examining the Role of Companies in Offensive Cyber OperationsIndexContributors