How Judges Reason

The Author: Mr. Levin received B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Chicago, a J.D. from Boston University, and a D. Phil. (Jurisprudence) from the University of Oxford. He has written widely on contract theory, legal reasoning, constitutional law, and the structure of common law. He now lives in Cleveland, where he teaches law and philosophy at Case Western Reserve University and practices in the area of civil litigation.

«This is an enormously energetic exploration, employing powerful analytical techniques and an exceptionally rich familiarity with both social philosophy and the practice of the law. Philosophers of law and other social realities, teachers and practitioners of law, and above all judges will find in the argument, and in its abundant illustrations and annotations, much matter for reflection. The book brings to the debate a distinctive voice, offering an account at once descriptive and normative.» (John Finnis, Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy, Oxford University)«'How Judges Reason' leads the reader flawlessly through the thicket of legal realism and the modern schools of skeptical analysis. As such it is an essential supplement to the commonly read works of Holmes, Gray, Llewellyn, Dworkin, and Hart. It is the most important book on judicial theory in the last thirty years.» (Daniel R. Coquillette, Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College, Reporter, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States.)

• Contents: The work provides a structure for judicial decision-making in the context of the judicial role, analyzes and critiques judicial skepticism, positivism, and rights theory, sets out a theory of judicial pluralism, discusses reasoning by analogy, and looks at the political consequences of pluralistic adjudication.