Petri Hakkarainen is the Political Director at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Prior to that, he worked for over five years as the Director of Foreign and Security Policy at the Office of the President of Finland. During his career at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs since 2006 he has been stationed in Washington, Berlin and Helsinki, as well as at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam. He received his doctorate in Modern History from the University of Oxford in 2008. In 2009 his dissertation was awarded the Willy Brandt Prize for the 'advancement of outstanding young scholars' by the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation.

“Hakkarainen’s monograph derives from a prize-winning dissertation, and the accolades are well deserved. The research base is admirably wide-ranging…[This is] an excellent study that constitutes essential reading for historians of détente in Europe…One can only hope that other researchers will write as fluidly and skillfully about those conferences—or about that other grindingly slow multilateral framework of the 1970s and 1980s: the talks on MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions). Hakkarainen’s book provides a worthy model.” • German Studies Review“Petri Hakkarainen deserves commendation for his thorough and well-researched account of West German government strategies and actions with regard to the CSCE between 1966 and 1975. This is true in particular for his refusal to write deterministic history from hindsight...This book is a very solid, reliable, and convincing piece of history on policy deliberations and diplomatic negotiations conducted by the West German government.” • American Historical Review“Hakkarainen’s study makes an important historiographical contribution alongside its empirical one. The author admonishes his readers: the CSCE together with the new Ostpolitik, which in his account are intimately linked, would indeed prove instrumental in ending the Cold War and bringing about German reunification, but this does not at all justify reading history backwards from the watershed years of 1989–91…For Hakkarainen, the infiltration of triumphalist narratives into histories of the CSCE, as well as of détente more broadly, must therefore be resolutely opposed and the history of the Cold War ought to be written ‘without prejudices based in the events of 1989–90.” • German History“West-Germany and the CSCE, 1966–1975is concisely written and develops our understanding of the pre-history of the CSCE, the FRG’s role vis-à-vis its Western allies and the complex linkages between its Ostpolitik and its interests in the CSCE.” • Journal of Contemporary History“In a balanced way the author blends German views with those from Britain, France, and the United States, using these countries’ official documents as well. His book represents a very serious piece of scholarship and is interesting to read. It excels with a novel hypothesis, a very careful use of varied archival sources, and an ability not to lose his argument in the wealth of material.” • Helga Haftendorn, Free University, Berlin“I don't know of any other book that deals so thoroughly with German CSCE policy in the years described here…The author has done a vast amount of research, using documents from different archives and different countries…While he is of course not the first scholar to write about the origins of the CSCE, the author does contribute new elements and interpretations to the topic.” • Benedikt Schönborn, University of Tampere, Centre for Advanced Study

• List of AbbreviationsAcknowledgementsChapter 1. Introduction: Era of NegotiationsEuropean DétenteThe CSCEGerman Foreign PolicyOn Structure and SourcesChapter 2. 1966-69: Incubation of StrategiesThe Early Years and the Eastern ‘Propaganda Circus’The Budapest Appeal: ‘We Could Have Drafted it Ourselves’Consultations Abroad, Electioneering at HomeNobody Expects the Finnish InitiativePromises of East-West Cooperation or an Instrument of Deutschlandpolitik?Chancellery versus Auswärtiges AmtEmphasis on Linkage: Bahr’s Foreign Policy Plans on the Eve of the ElectionBonn and the Security Conference during the InterregnumConclusionChapter 3. 1969-70: Bilateral Leverages and European SecurityWestern Support for the Linkage with DeutschlandpolitikHorse-Trading in MoscowRethinking the Linkage StrategyBerlin Surpasses Other PreconditionsDiscovering the Potential of the CSCEConference on Security or Conference on Cooperation?ConclusionChapter 4. 1970-71: Transition to Western MultilateralismFollowing the French Lead on Berlin LinkageDefending the Berlin Precondition in LisbonDivergent Interpretations of the ‘Successful Conclusion’Nothing Quiet on the Western FrontBroadening the German Horizon in the NATO FrameworkFrom America’s Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPCConclusionChapter 5. 1971-72: Towards a European Peace Order?The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE and DeutschlandpolitikHesitating on the Berlin PreconditionBlackmailing the Finns?An Inner-German Shotgun WeddingEuropeanisation of OstpolitikIn Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn’s SovereigntyA New Flow of German ActivityPeaceful Change, Self-Determination of Peoples and Military SecurityFreer Movement: Change through Rapprochement?Berlin as a CSCE Location?Avoiding BilateralismConclusionChapter 6. 1972-75: Deutschlandpolitik at the ConferenceAlphabet Diplomacy in DipoliPeaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow TreatyPeaceful Change, Act 2: Enter GenscherPeaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National InterestBasket III: Human ContactsFollow-up and BerlinConclusionChapter 7. Conclusion: Evolution instead of RevolutionSources and BibliographyIndex

Petri Hakkarainen is the Political Director at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Prior to that, he worked for over five years as the Director of Foreign and Security Policy at the Office of the President of Finland. During his career at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs since 2006 he has been stationed in Washington, Berlin and Helsinki, as well as at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam. He received his doctorate in Modern History from the University of Oxford in 2008. In 2009 his dissertation was awarded the Willy Brandt Prize for the 'advancement of outstanding young scholars' by the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation.

“Hakkarainen’s monograph derives from a prize-winning dissertation, and the accolades are well deserved. The research base is admirably wide-ranging…[This is] an excellent study that constitutes essential reading for historians of détente in Europe…One can only hope that other researchers will write as fluidly and skillfully about those conferences—or about that other grindingly slow multilateral framework of the 1970s and 1980s: the talks on MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions). Hakkarainen’s book provides a worthy model.” • German Studies Review“Petri Hakkarainen deserves commendation for his thorough and well-researched account of West German government strategies and actions with regard to the CSCE between 1966 and 1975. This is true in particular for his refusal to write deterministic history from hindsight...This book is a very solid, reliable, and convincing piece of history on policy deliberations and diplomatic negotiations conducted by the West German government.” • American Historical Review“Hakkarainen’s study makes an important historiographical contribution alongside its empirical one. The author admonishes his readers: the CSCE together with the new Ostpolitik, which in his account are intimately linked, would indeed prove instrumental in ending the Cold War and bringing about German reunification, but this does not at all justify reading history backwards from the watershed years of 1989–91…For Hakkarainen, the infiltration of triumphalist narratives into histories of the CSCE, as well as of détente more broadly, must therefore be resolutely opposed and the history of the Cold War ought to be written ‘without prejudices based in the events of 1989–90.” • German History“West-Germany and the CSCE, 1966–1975is concisely written and develops our understanding of the pre-history of the CSCE, the FRG’s role vis-à-vis its Western allies and the complex linkages between its Ostpolitik and its interests in the CSCE.” • Journal of Contemporary History“In a balanced way the author blends German views with those from Britain, France, and the United States, using these countries’ official documents as well. His book represents a very serious piece of scholarship and is interesting to read. It excels with a novel hypothesis, a very careful use of varied archival sources, and an ability not to lose his argument in the wealth of material.” • Helga Haftendorn, Free University, Berlin“I don't know of any other book that deals so thoroughly with German CSCE policy in the years described here…The author has done a vast amount of research, using documents from different archives and different countries…While he is of course not the first scholar to write about the origins of the CSCE, the author does contribute new elements and interpretations to the topic.” • Benedikt Schönborn, University of Tampere, Centre for Advanced Study

• List of AbbreviationsAcknowledgementsChapter 1. Introduction: Era of NegotiationsEuropean DétenteThe CSCEGerman Foreign PolicyOn Structure and SourcesChapter 2. 1966-69: Incubation of StrategiesThe Early Years and the Eastern ‘Propaganda Circus’The Budapest Appeal: ‘We Could Have Drafted it Ourselves’Consultations Abroad, Electioneering at HomeNobody Expects the Finnish InitiativePromises of East-West Cooperation or an Instrument of Deutschlandpolitik?Chancellery versus Auswärtiges AmtEmphasis on Linkage: Bahr’s Foreign Policy Plans on the Eve of the ElectionBonn and the Security Conference during the InterregnumConclusionChapter 3. 1969-70: Bilateral Leverages and European SecurityWestern Support for the Linkage with DeutschlandpolitikHorse-Trading in MoscowRethinking the Linkage StrategyBerlin Surpasses Other PreconditionsDiscovering the Potential of the CSCEConference on Security or Conference on Cooperation?ConclusionChapter 4. 1970-71: Transition to Western MultilateralismFollowing the French Lead on Berlin LinkageDefending the Berlin Precondition in LisbonDivergent Interpretations of the ‘Successful Conclusion’Nothing Quiet on the Western FrontBroadening the German Horizon in the NATO FrameworkFrom America’s Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPCConclusionChapter 5. 1971-72: Towards a European Peace Order?The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE and DeutschlandpolitikHesitating on the Berlin PreconditionBlackmailing the Finns?An Inner-German Shotgun WeddingEuropeanisation of OstpolitikIn Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn’s SovereigntyA New Flow of German ActivityPeaceful Change, Self-Determination of Peoples and Military SecurityFreer Movement: Change through Rapprochement?Berlin as a CSCE Location?Avoiding BilateralismConclusionChapter 6. 1972-75: Deutschlandpolitik at the ConferenceAlphabet Diplomacy in DipoliPeaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow TreatyPeaceful Change, Act 2: Enter GenscherPeaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National InterestBasket III: Human ContactsFollow-up and BerlinConclusionChapter 7. Conclusion: Evolution instead of RevolutionSources and BibliographyIndex

Petri Hakkarainen is the Political Director at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Prior to that, he worked for over five years as the Director of Foreign and Security Policy at the Office of the President of Finland. During his career at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs since 2006 he has been stationed in Washington, Berlin and Helsinki, as well as at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam. He received his doctorate in Modern History from the University of Oxford in 2008. In 2009 his dissertation was awarded the Willy Brandt Prize for the 'advancement of outstanding young scholars' by the Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation.

“Hakkarainen’s monograph derives from a prize-winning dissertation, and the accolades are well deserved. The research base is admirably wide-ranging…[This is] an excellent study that constitutes essential reading for historians of détente in Europe…One can only hope that other researchers will write as fluidly and skillfully about those conferences—or about that other grindingly slow multilateral framework of the 1970s and 1980s: the talks on MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions). Hakkarainen’s book provides a worthy model.” • German Studies Review“Petri Hakkarainen deserves commendation for his thorough and well-researched account of West German government strategies and actions with regard to the CSCE between 1966 and 1975. This is true in particular for his refusal to write deterministic history from hindsight...This book is a very solid, reliable, and convincing piece of history on policy deliberations and diplomatic negotiations conducted by the West German government.” • American Historical Review“Hakkarainen’s study makes an important historiographical contribution alongside its empirical one. The author admonishes his readers: the CSCE together with the new Ostpolitik, which in his account are intimately linked, would indeed prove instrumental in ending the Cold War and bringing about German reunification, but this does not at all justify reading history backwards from the watershed years of 1989–91…For Hakkarainen, the infiltration of triumphalist narratives into histories of the CSCE, as well as of détente more broadly, must therefore be resolutely opposed and the history of the Cold War ought to be written ‘without prejudices based in the events of 1989–90.” • German History“West-Germany and the CSCE, 1966–1975is concisely written and develops our understanding of the pre-history of the CSCE, the FRG’s role vis-à-vis its Western allies and the complex linkages between its Ostpolitik and its interests in the CSCE.” • Journal of Contemporary History“In a balanced way the author blends German views with those from Britain, France, and the United States, using these countries’ official documents as well. His book represents a very serious piece of scholarship and is interesting to read. It excels with a novel hypothesis, a very careful use of varied archival sources, and an ability not to lose his argument in the wealth of material.” • Helga Haftendorn, Free University, Berlin“I don't know of any other book that deals so thoroughly with German CSCE policy in the years described here…The author has done a vast amount of research, using documents from different archives and different countries…While he is of course not the first scholar to write about the origins of the CSCE, the author does contribute new elements and interpretations to the topic.” • Benedikt Schönborn, University of Tampere, Centre for Advanced Study

• List of AbbreviationsAcknowledgementsChapter 1. Introduction: Era of NegotiationsEuropean DétenteThe CSCEGerman Foreign PolicyOn Structure and SourcesChapter 2. 1966-69: Incubation of StrategiesThe Early Years and the Eastern ‘Propaganda Circus’The Budapest Appeal: ‘We Could Have Drafted it Ourselves’Consultations Abroad, Electioneering at HomeNobody Expects the Finnish InitiativePromises of East-West Cooperation or an Instrument of Deutschlandpolitik?Chancellery versus Auswärtiges AmtEmphasis on Linkage: Bahr’s Foreign Policy Plans on the Eve of the ElectionBonn and the Security Conference during the InterregnumConclusionChapter 3. 1969-70: Bilateral Leverages and European SecurityWestern Support for the Linkage with DeutschlandpolitikHorse-Trading in MoscowRethinking the Linkage StrategyBerlin Surpasses Other PreconditionsDiscovering the Potential of the CSCEConference on Security or Conference on Cooperation?ConclusionChapter 4. 1970-71: Transition to Western MultilateralismFollowing the French Lead on Berlin LinkageDefending the Berlin Precondition in LisbonDivergent Interpretations of the ‘Successful Conclusion’Nothing Quiet on the Western FrontBroadening the German Horizon in the NATO FrameworkFrom America’s Advocate to the Main Proponent of EPCConclusionChapter 5. 1971-72: Towards a European Peace Order?The Decline of the Linkage between the CSCE and DeutschlandpolitikHesitating on the Berlin PreconditionBlackmailing the Finns?An Inner-German Shotgun WeddingEuropeanisation of OstpolitikIn Defence of the Eastern Treaties and Bonn’s SovereigntyA New Flow of German ActivityPeaceful Change, Self-Determination of Peoples and Military SecurityFreer Movement: Change through Rapprochement?Berlin as a CSCE Location?Avoiding BilateralismConclusionChapter 6. 1972-75: Deutschlandpolitik at the ConferenceAlphabet Diplomacy in DipoliPeaceful Change, Act 1: Defending the Moscow TreatyPeaceful Change, Act 2: Enter GenscherPeaceful Change, Act 3: Commas for the National InterestBasket III: Human ContactsFollow-up and BerlinConclusionChapter 7. Conclusion: Evolution instead of RevolutionSources and BibliographyIndex