Roger D. Blair is Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. Christine Piette Durrance is Associate Professor in the La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Tirza Angerhofer is Doctoral Fellow of Economics at Duke University.

'This is the best executed examination of the role of competition policy in health care markets in its field. It addresses everything from patent abuses and pay-for-delay settlements, to price fixing, licensing, group purchasing, labor relations, mergers, and vertical integration. The authors are highly respected academics and practitioners in the discipline. This book is a must read for everyone interested in antitrust law and competition in health care markets.' Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Pennsylvania

• 1. Health care markets and competition policy; 2. Antitrust policy in the United States; Section I. Monopoly: 3 Patents and monopoly pricing of pharmaceuticals; 4. Patents and exclusionary product hopping; 5. Bundled discounts and peace health; Section II. Seller Cartels: 6. Collusion in health care markets; 7. Collusion in generic drug markets; 8. The hatch-waxman act, patent infringement suits, and reverse payments; Appendix; The economics of settlements; 9. The alleged insulin conspiracy; 10. Licensing of health care professionals; Section III. Monopsony: 11. Monopsony, dominant buyers, and oligopsony; 12. Countervailing power – physician collective bargaining; 13. Group purchasing organizations, monopsony, and antitrust policy; Section IV. Buyer Cartels: 14. Collusion in the nurse labor market; 15. Collusion in the oocyte market; 16. No-Poaching agreements and antitrust policy; Section V. Mergers and Acquisitions: 17. The economics of horizontal mergers; 18. Horizontal merger policy; 19. The economic theory of vertical integration; 20. Vertical merger policy; 21. Concluding remarks.

Roger D. Blair is Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. Christine Piette Durrance is Associate Professor in the La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Tirza Angerhofer is Doctoral Fellow of Economics at Duke University.

'This is the best executed examination of the role of competition policy in health care markets in its field. It addresses everything from patent abuses and pay-for-delay settlements, to price fixing, licensing, group purchasing, labor relations, mergers, and vertical integration. The authors are highly respected academics and practitioners in the discipline. This book is a must read for everyone interested in antitrust law and competition in health care markets.' Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Pennsylvania

• 1. Health care markets and competition policy; 2. Antitrust policy in the United States; Section I. Monopoly: 3 Patents and monopoly pricing of pharmaceuticals; 4. Patents and exclusionary product hopping; 5. Bundled discounts and peace health; Section II. Seller Cartels: 6. Collusion in health care markets; 7. Collusion in generic drug markets; 8. The hatch-waxman act, patent infringement suits, and reverse payments; Appendix; The economics of settlements; 9. The alleged insulin conspiracy; 10. Licensing of health care professionals; Section III. Monopsony: 11. Monopsony, dominant buyers, and oligopsony; 12. Countervailing power – physician collective bargaining; 13. Group purchasing organizations, monopsony, and antitrust policy; Section IV. Buyer Cartels: 14. Collusion in the nurse labor market; 15. Collusion in the oocyte market; 16. No-Poaching agreements and antitrust policy; Section V. Mergers and Acquisitions: 17. The economics of horizontal mergers; 18. Horizontal merger policy; 19. The economic theory of vertical integration; 20. Vertical merger policy; 21. Concluding remarks.

Roger D. Blair is Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. Christine Piette Durrance is Associate Professor in the La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Tirza Angerhofer is Doctoral Fellow of Economics at Duke University.

'This is the best executed examination of the role of competition policy in health care markets in its field. It addresses everything from patent abuses and pay-for-delay settlements, to price fixing, licensing, group purchasing, labor relations, mergers, and vertical integration. The authors are highly respected academics and practitioners in the discipline. This book is a must read for everyone interested in antitrust law and competition in health care markets.' Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Pennsylvania

• 1. Health care markets and competition policy; 2. Antitrust policy in the United States; Section I. Monopoly: 3 Patents and monopoly pricing of pharmaceuticals; 4. Patents and exclusionary product hopping; 5. Bundled discounts and peace health; Section II. Seller Cartels: 6. Collusion in health care markets; 7. Collusion in generic drug markets; 8. The hatch-waxman act, patent infringement suits, and reverse payments; Appendix; The economics of settlements; 9. The alleged insulin conspiracy; 10. Licensing of health care professionals; Section III. Monopsony: 11. Monopsony, dominant buyers, and oligopsony; 12. Countervailing power – physician collective bargaining; 13. Group purchasing organizations, monopsony, and antitrust policy; Section IV. Buyer Cartels: 14. Collusion in the nurse labor market; 15. Collusion in the oocyte market; 16. No-Poaching agreements and antitrust policy; Section V. Mergers and Acquisitions: 17. The economics of horizontal mergers; 18. Horizontal merger policy; 19. The economic theory of vertical integration; 20. Vertical merger policy; 21. Concluding remarks.