What is moral philosophy? That is the question with which this important volume grapples. Its starting point is the famous critique made in 1958 by Elizabeth Anscombe, who argued that moral philosophy begins from a mistake: that it is fundamentally wrong about the sort of concept that the word ''moral'' represents. Anscombe rejected moral philosophy as it was then (and mostly now still is) practised. She offered instead a blueprint for the task moral philosophers must embrace if they are to speak intelligibly to society about good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation. The chapters in this book are inspired by Anscombe''s classic text. One of the most powerful voices here, among many authoritative voices, is that of Philippa Foot – Anscombe''s lifelong friend – who asserts that ''any account of practical reason evacuated of an understanding of what human beings need to flourish is inadequate and must be rejected.''

What is moral philosophy? That is the question with which this important volume grapples. Its starting point is the famous critique made in 1958 by Elizabeth Anscombe, who argued that moral philosophy begins from a mistake: that it is fundamentally wrong about the sort of concept that the word ''moral'' represents. Anscombe rejected moral philosophy as it was then (and mostly now still is) practised. She offered instead a blueprint for the task moral philosophers must embrace if they are to speak intelligibly to society about good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation. The chapters in this book are inspired by Anscombe''s classic text. One of the most powerful voices here, among many authoritative voices, is that of Philippa Foot – Anscombe''s lifelong friend – who asserts that ''any account of practical reason evacuated of an understanding of what human beings need to flourish is inadequate and must be rejected.''

What is moral philosophy? That is the question with which this important volume grapples. Its starting point is the famous critique made in 1958 by Elizabeth Anscombe, who argued that moral philosophy begins from a mistake: that it is fundamentally wrong about the sort of concept that the word ''moral'' represents. Anscombe rejected moral philosophy as it was then (and mostly now still is) practised. She offered instead a blueprint for the task moral philosophers must embrace if they are to speak intelligibly to society about good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation. The chapters in this book are inspired by Anscombe''s classic text. One of the most powerful voices here, among many authoritative voices, is that of Philippa Foot – Anscombe''s lifelong friend – who asserts that ''any account of practical reason evacuated of an understanding of what human beings need to flourish is inadequate and must be rejected.''