Understanding Modern Warfare

David Jordan is Deputy Head of the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, based at the Defence Academy of the UK, Shrivenham and a founding co-director of the Freeman Air & Space Institute. He also serves as a Director of the RAF's Centre Air & Space Power Studies and has authored numerous articles and book chapters addressing air and space power issues. James D. Kiras is Dean and Professor at the School of Advanced Air & Space Studies (SAASS), the US Air Force's premier school of strategy. He is the author of Special Operations Success: Balancing Capabilities and Control (2025) and Special Operations Strategy: From World War II the War on Terrorism (2006), and co-editor of Into the Void: Special Operations Forces After the War on Terrorism (2024), Strategic Sabotage (2021), and Special Operations: Out of the Shadows (2020). David J. Lonsdale is Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the University of Hull. He is the author of Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy (2008), The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future (2003), Alexander, Killer of Men: Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Art of War (2004), and co-author of Understanding Contemporary Strategy (2019). Ian Speller is Professor of Military History and Director of the Centre for Military History and Strategic Studies at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. He also lectures at the Irish Military College. He is the author of numerous works on maritime strategy and naval warfare, including Understanding Naval Warfare (2024), The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy, 1945–1956 (2001) and, as co-editor, Small Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace (2014) and Europe, Small Navies and Maritime Security (2021). Christopher Tuck is Reader in Strategic Studies in the Department of Defence Studies, King's College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham. He is the author of Understanding Land Warfare (2022), and Confrontation, Strategy, and War Termination (2013), co-author of Amphibious Warfare: Strategy and Tactics from Gallipoli to Iraq (2014) and co-editor of British Propaganda and Wars of Empire: Influencing Friend and Foe (2014). C. Dale Walton is a retired Professor of International Relations at Lindenwood University and Senior Fellow with Lindenwood's Hammond Institute. He is the author of The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam (2002), Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: Multipolarity and the Revolution in Strategic Perspective (2007), and Grand Strategy and the Presidency: Foreign Policy, War and the American Role in the World (2012).

'This third revised and updated edition of Understanding Modern Warfare should be the basic textbook for all military academies and university courses on warfare!' Beatrice Heuser, Head of Strategy Teaching at the German General Staff Academy, Hamburg

• Introduction Ian Speller; Part I. Strategy David J. Lonsdale: 1. The study and theory of strategy; 2. Strategy defined; 3. The practice of strategy; Part II. Land Warfare Christopher Tuck: 4. Concepts of land warfare; 5. Modern land warfare; 6. Future land warfare; Part III. Naval Warfare Ian Speller: 7. Concepts of naval warfare; 8. The evolution of naval warfare; 9. Naval warfare in the twenty-first century; Part IV. Air and Space Warfare David Jordan: 10. Concepts and characteristics of air and space warfare; 11. The Evolution of air and space power; 12. Air and space power in the contemporary era: 2000–2040; Part V. Irregular Warfare James D. Kiras: 13. Key concepts and terms of irregular warfare; 14. The historical practice of irregular warfare; 15. Current irregular warfare; Part VI. Weapons of Mass Destruction C. Dale Walton: 16. Weapons of mass destruction: radiological, biological and chemical weapons; 17. Weapons of mass destruction: nuclear weapons; Part VII. Current and Future Challenges Ian Speller: 18. Joint warfare; 19. Cyber warfare; 20. Hybrid warfare, Grey zone conflict, and strategic competition; Part VIII. Conclusion David J. Lonsdale: 21. Continuity and change in modern warfare.