Fiscal Constitutionalism and the Power of the Purse

Addressing the fundamental democratic question of who should control public money, this instructive book presents insights from the experience of constitutional reform in a diverse set of developed countries. It examines how budgetary power is allocated between the executive branches and why such arrangements have become increasingly controversial.Through balanced analysis, expert contributors challenge the assumption that stronger legislative control or transforming the budget into formal law automatically produces better fiscal democracy. Drawing on international comparative experiences from France, Germany, Japan, the US and other OECD countries, they demonstrate that there is no single most democratic model for managing public budgets. The book concludes that effective fiscal governance depends less on symbolic shifts of authority and more on institutional balance, clear procedures and practical capacity. It recommends that for countries such as South Korea, the fiscal constitution should be reformed with caution, strengthening democratic accountability while preserving financial sustainability.Fiscal Constitutionalism and the Power of the Purse is a key resource for scholars and students in public finance, public policy, political economics, constitutional law and public law. The practical lessons on executive–legislative balance and fiscal sustainability are also invaluable for policy practitioners and government officials.