This book examines how philosophers can justify theories of moral progress without relying on unexamined liberal assumptions. It argues that a credible theory must explain why certain moral judgments are more reliable than their rivals.The book develops a genealogical method for evaluating moral progress judgments. It analyses how such judgments are shaped, accepted, and transmitted through conceptual frameworks, narratives, and persuasive practices. It enables philosophers to determine whether specific judgments are grounded in reliable evidence or influenced by distorted assumptions and selective belief patterns. The book integrates methodological argumentation with historical and philosophical case studies, including pro-slavery ideologies in antebellum America, German nationalism after World War I, abolitionism, and women’s emancipation. Through these examples, it offers a framework for defending theories of moral progress without presupposing the very moral outlook they aim to justify.Bridging moral philosophy, history, and social sciences, this work provides a rigorous approach to justifying claims about moral progress. It is an essential resource for scholars and students in these fields interested in moral theory and historical analysis.
