The book defends an account of propositions on which propositions are structured entities, built up out of properties, relations, and concrete objects. On this account, propositions exist and have truth conditions independent of human minds and linguistic activity.While this view of propositions has existed for more than 100 years, it has been under attack over the last two decades. It has come under attack from those who agree that propositions are structured but think that propositions obtain their semantic properties (things like truth conditions) from human mental or linguistic activity. It has also been attacked by those who deny that propositions are structured entities. This book responds to challenges from those who think that accounting for the truth conditions of mind-independent structured propositions is problematic. It critiques competing anti-realist views, offers a new account of singular propositions based on constituent contributions to truth conditions, and examines truth conditions for negative existential sentences. Throughout, the author builds a systematic case against propositions as primitive or set-theoretic entities.The Metaphysics of Propositions will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and semantics.

The book defends an account of propositions on which propositions are structured entities, built up out of properties, relations, and concrete objects. On this account, propositions exist and have truth conditions independent of human minds and linguistic activity.While this view of propositions has existed for more than 100 years, it has been under attack over the last two decades. It has come under attack from those who agree that propositions are structured but think that propositions obtain their semantic properties (things like truth conditions) from human mental or linguistic activity. It has also been attacked by those who deny that propositions are structured entities. This book responds to challenges from those who think that accounting for the truth conditions of mind-independent structured propositions is problematic. It critiques competing anti-realist views, offers a new account of singular propositions based on constituent contributions to truth conditions, and examines truth conditions for negative existential sentences. Throughout, the author builds a systematic case against propositions as primitive or set-theoretic entities.The Metaphysics of Propositions will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and semantics.

The book defends an account of propositions on which propositions are structured entities, built up out of properties, relations, and concrete objects. On this account, propositions exist and have truth conditions independent of human minds and linguistic activity.While this view of propositions has existed for more than 100 years, it has been under attack over the last two decades. It has come under attack from those who agree that propositions are structured but think that propositions obtain their semantic properties (things like truth conditions) from human mental or linguistic activity. It has also been attacked by those who deny that propositions are structured entities. This book responds to challenges from those who think that accounting for the truth conditions of mind-independent structured propositions is problematic. It critiques competing anti-realist views, offers a new account of singular propositions based on constituent contributions to truth conditions, and examines truth conditions for negative existential sentences. Throughout, the author builds a systematic case against propositions as primitive or set-theoretic entities.The Metaphysics of Propositions will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and semantics.