Martin Bichler is Professor of Informatics at the Technische Universität München (TUM), and a faculty member at the TUM School of Management. He is known for his academic work on market design, and he has acted as a consultant for private and public organizations including regulators, telecoms, and procurement organizations. Projects in which he is involved include the design of auctions for industrial procurement, logistics, advertising, fishery access rights, and spectrum sales. His research addresses algorithmic, game-theoretical, and behavioral questions and has appeared in leading journals in computer science, economics, operations research, and management science. He is currently Editor of Business and Information Systems Engineering and serves on the editorial boards of several academic journals. Jacob Goeree is SHARP Professor and Director of the AGORA Center for Market Design at University of New South Wales, Sydney. He is a world-leading experimenter, theorist and market designer whose research has influenced the design of spectrum auctions and markets for pollution permits and fishing shares. Goeree was Research Fellow of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and is Fellow of the Econometric Society and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. He served as President of the Economic Science Association and as Editor of Experimental Economics. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior.

'This superb Handbook is a milestone in the progress of market design. It's a comprehensive analysis of designs, implementation, experimental testing, and bidding experience in auctions and similar markets for spectrum licenses. The authors achieved remarkable success in many auctions after the initial FCC auction began worldwide efforts to allocate licenses more efficiently via market mechanisms. The distinguished contributors report their solutions to difficult problems, the resulting performance, and remaining challenges.' Robert Wilson, Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Stanford University

• Preface; Part I. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction: 1. Putting auction theory to work: the simultaneous ascending auction; 2. An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction; 3. The efficiency of the FCC spectrum auctions; 4. Measuring the efficiency of an FCC spectrum auction; Part II. The Combinatorial Clock Auction Formats: 5. Combinatorial auction design; 6. The clock-proxy auction: a practical combinatorial auction design; 7. Spectrum auction design; 8. A practical guide to the combinatorial clock auction; 9. Market design and the evolution of the combinatorial clock auction; 10. Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions; 11. Core-selecting package auctions; 12. A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions; 13. On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions; 14. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders; 15. Properties of the combinatorial clock auction; 16. Budget constraints combinatorial clock auctions; 17. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions: about inconsistent bidding and its impact on efficiency in the combinatorial clock auction; Part III. Alternative Auction Designs: 18. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation; 19. A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions; 20. Hierarchical package bidding: a paper and pencil combinatorial auction; 21. Assignment messages and exchanges; 22. The product-mix auction: a new auction design for differentiated goods; 23. The continuous combinatorial auction architecture; 24. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions; Part IV. Experimental Comparisons of Auction Designs: 25. Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms; 26. Laboratory experimental testbeds: application to the PCS auction; 27. An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats; 28. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design; 29. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs; 30. Spectrum auction design: simple auctions for complex sales; Part V. The Bidders' Perspective: 31. Winning play in spectrum auctions; 32. Up in the air: GTE's experience in the MTA auction for personal communication services licenses; 33. Bidding complexities in the combinatorial clock auction; 34. Strategic bidding in combinatorial clock auctions – a bidder perspective; 35. Impact of budget-contraints on the efficiency of multi-lot spectrum auctions; Part VI. Secondary Markets and Exchanges: 36. Spectrum markets: motivation, challenges, and implications; 37. Designing the US incentive auction; 38. Solving the station repacking problem; 39. ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange; 40. ACE: a combinatorial market mechanism; Outlook.