William Mulligan is a lecturer in the School of History and Archives, University College Dublin. He is the author of The Creation of the Modern German Army (2005) and The Great War for Peace (2014), and co-editor of The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War (2015).

'Mulligan's approach is long overdue. Rather than focus on the traditional reasons - nationalism, arms races, militarism and alliance structures - adduced to show why war was inevitable, Mulligan challenges us to consider why the powerful restraints against war proved inadequate in 1914. The result is to deepen and enrich our understanding of the origins of the war.' Keith Neilson, Royal Military College of Canada

• 1. Introduction; 2. Security and expansion: the great powers and geopolitics, 1871–1914; 3. The military, war, and international politics; 4. Public opinion and international relations; 5. The world economy and international politics before 1914; 6. The July Crisis; 7. Conclusion.

William Mulligan is a lecturer in the School of History and Archives, University College Dublin. He is the author of The Creation of the Modern German Army (2005) and The Great War for Peace (2014), and co-editor of The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War (2015).

'Mulligan's approach is long overdue. Rather than focus on the traditional reasons - nationalism, arms races, militarism and alliance structures - adduced to show why war was inevitable, Mulligan challenges us to consider why the powerful restraints against war proved inadequate in 1914. The result is to deepen and enrich our understanding of the origins of the war.' Keith Neilson, Royal Military College of Canada

• 1. Introduction; 2. Security and expansion: the great powers and geopolitics, 1871–1914; 3. The military, war, and international politics; 4. Public opinion and international relations; 5. The world economy and international politics before 1914; 6. The July Crisis; 7. Conclusion.