First published in 1928, this was one of the first in-depth studies to investigate why the English navy was unable to prevent William of Orange's invasion in 1688. Edward B. Powley argues that a combination of bad strategic choices as well as adverse weather, William's so-called 'Protestant wind', resulted in the Navy failing to stop the Dutch Fleet landing, and ultimately enabled William to take possession of the country and crown. In a detailed chronological narrative of naval events between the spring of 1687 and February 1689, Powley charts the key decisions as documented in the archival record, focusing particularly on the Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Dartmouth's surviving papers and what they reveal about the input of King James II to naval affairs.

First published in 1928, this was one of the first in-depth studies to investigate why the English navy was unable to prevent William of Orange's invasion in 1688. Edward B. Powley argues that a combination of bad strategic choices as well as adverse weather, William's so-called 'Protestant wind', resulted in the Navy failing to stop the Dutch Fleet landing, and ultimately enabled William to take possession of the country and crown. In a detailed chronological narrative of naval events between the spring of 1687 and February 1689, Powley charts the key decisions as documented in the archival record, focusing particularly on the Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Dartmouth's surviving papers and what they reveal about the input of King James II to naval affairs.