Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief

Essays on the Lottery Paradox

Inbunden, Engelska, 2021

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Beskrivning

We talk and think about our beliefs both in a categorical (yes/no) and in a graded way. How do the two kinds of belief hang together? The most straightforward answer is that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree. But this seemingly obvious, near-platitudinous claim is known to give rise to a paradox commonly known as the 'lottery paradox' - at least when it is coupled with some further seeming near-platitudes about belief. How to resolve that paradox has been a matter of intense philosophical debate for over fifty years. This volume offers a collection of newly commissioned essays on the subject, all of which provide compelling reasons for rethinking many of the fundamentals of the debate.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2021-02-04
Mått:158 x 235 x 22 mm
Vikt:556 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:280
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9781108421911

Utforska kategorier

Filosofi inom Filosofi och religion
Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion
Historia inom Historia och arkeologi

Mer om författaren

Igor Douven is a CNRS Research Professor at Paris-Sorbonne University. His essays have appeared in numerous major philosophy and cognitive science journals, and he is the author of The Epistemology of Indicative Conditionals (Cambridge, 2016).

Innehållsförteckning

Introduction Igor Douven; 1. Rational belief and statistical evidence: blame, bias, and the law Dana Nelkin; 2. Knowledge attributions and lottery cases: a review and new evidence John Turri; 3. The psychological dimension of the lottery paradox Jennifer Nagel; 4. Three puzzles about lotteries Julia Staffel; 5. Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified Martin Smith; 6. Rethinking the lottery paradox: a dual processing perspective Igor Douven and Shira Elqayam; 7. Rational belief in lottery- and preface-situations: impossibility results and possible solutions Gerhard Schurz; 8. Stability and the lottery paradox Hannes Leitgeb; 9. The lottery, the preface and epistemic rule consequentialism Christoph Kelp and Francesco Praolini; 10. Beliefs, probabilities, and their coherent correspondence Kevin Kelly and Hanti Lin; 11. The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: a general impossibility theorem Franz Dietrich and Christian List; Bibliography; Index.