The Volatility Curse

Daniela Campello is Associate Professor of Politics at the Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration, Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Her research lies on the frontier of comparative and international political economy, with a focus on the consequences of globalization to domestic politics in emerging economies. She is the author of The Politics of Market Discipline in Latin America (2015), and her work also appears in top political science journals. Daniela was an Oxford-CAF Visiting Fellow of International Economics at the University of Oxford and was previously an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, New Jersey. Cesar Zucco is Associate Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration, Fundação Getúlio Vargas. He is co-author of Partisans, Antipartisans, and Nonpartisans (2018) and has published widely in leading political science journals. He studies political behavior, institutions, and ideology in Brazil and in Latin America. He has held visiting appointments at Princeton University, New Jersey, Yale University, Connecticut, and the University of Oxford, and was previously Assistant Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, New Jersey.

'Because of their sensitivity to international commodity prices and capital flows, Latin American economies undergo substantial volatility. Hence, those countries provide an excellent test of whether elections work as intended in modern democratic theory. Do the voters understand when their incumbents are not to blame for the economic downturns? Or do they punish anyway? This book provides new and powerful evidence that the voters just kick the dog when times are hard, even when the truth is patiently explained to them. The result is a powerful challenge to contemporary orthodoxies about the accountability of democratic governments.' Christopher H. Achen, Princeton University, New Jersey

• 1. Introduction: representation in volatile economies; 2. Economic vote, exogenous shocks, and representation; 3. Can economic vote promote representation?; 4. International factors and economic performance in Latin America; 5. International factors and presidential elections; 6. International factors and popular support; 7. Understanding misattribution of responsibility; 8. Misattribution and incumbent behavior; 9. Conclusion: pathways to better representation; References; Index.