Series EditorsErnest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, and has published extensively in epistemology, metaphysics, and other areas.Enrique Villanueva is a member of the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas at UNAM, and has published in the philosophy of mind.Guest EditorBaron Reed is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at Northwestern University, and his main areas of interest are epistemology (scepticism) and the history of epistemology.

• 1. Knowledge and ActionPyrrhonian Skepticism and Human  AgencyERNEST SOSA  1Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Action STEPHEN HETHERINGTON  18Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and  Epistemic AgencyBARON REED  402. Agency and ResponsibilityRational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’  RALPH WEDGWOOD  70Obsessive Thoughts and Inner VoicesLUCY O’BRIEN  93The Possibility of Epistemic ResponsibilityMIGUEL´ANGEL FERNANDEZ 109Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic AgencyCONOR MCHUGH  132Is Epistemic Agency Possible?  PASCAL ENGEL  158Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts  KIERAN SETIYA  179Can Virtue Epistemology Capitalize on JTB’s Appeal?E. J. COFFMAN  1993. Intellectual VirtuesIn Defense of ReflectionVALERIE TIBERIUS  223Intellectual AutonomyLINDA ZAGZEBSKI  244A Neo-Stoic Approach to Epistemic AgencySARAH WRIGHT  262Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves for Epistemic ImprovementKRISTOFFER AHLSTROM-VIJ  2764. Reasoning and Epistemic NormsScope for Rational AutonomyMARK SCHROEDER  297Why We Reason the Way We DoNISHI SHAH  311Cognitive Diversity and Epistemic NormsJESSICA BROWN  326Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical ReasonsMICHAEL P. LYNCH  343The Rejection of Epistemic ConsequentialismSELIM BERKER  363What Is an Inference?  RAM NETA  388Errata  408

Series EditorsErnest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, and has published extensively in epistemology, metaphysics, and other areas.Enrique Villanueva is a member of the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas at UNAM, and has published in the philosophy of mind.Guest EditorBaron Reed is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at Northwestern University, and his main areas of interest are epistemology (scepticism) and the history of epistemology.

• 1. Knowledge and ActionPyrrhonian Skepticism and Human  AgencyERNEST SOSA  1Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Action STEPHEN HETHERINGTON  18Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and  Epistemic AgencyBARON REED  402. Agency and ResponsibilityRational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’  RALPH WEDGWOOD  70Obsessive Thoughts and Inner VoicesLUCY O’BRIEN  93The Possibility of Epistemic ResponsibilityMIGUEL´ANGEL FERNANDEZ 109Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic AgencyCONOR MCHUGH  132Is Epistemic Agency Possible?  PASCAL ENGEL  158Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts  KIERAN SETIYA  179Can Virtue Epistemology Capitalize on JTB’s Appeal?E. J. COFFMAN  1993. Intellectual VirtuesIn Defense of ReflectionVALERIE TIBERIUS  223Intellectual AutonomyLINDA ZAGZEBSKI  244A Neo-Stoic Approach to Epistemic AgencySARAH WRIGHT  262Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves for Epistemic ImprovementKRISTOFFER AHLSTROM-VIJ  2764. Reasoning and Epistemic NormsScope for Rational AutonomyMARK SCHROEDER  297Why We Reason the Way We DoNISHI SHAH  311Cognitive Diversity and Epistemic NormsJESSICA BROWN  326Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical ReasonsMICHAEL P. LYNCH  343The Rejection of Epistemic ConsequentialismSELIM BERKER  363What Is an Inference?  RAM NETA  388Errata  408

Series EditorsErnest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, and has published extensively in epistemology, metaphysics, and other areas.Enrique Villanueva is a member of the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas at UNAM, and has published in the philosophy of mind.Guest EditorBaron Reed is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at Northwestern University, and his main areas of interest are epistemology (scepticism) and the history of epistemology.

• 1. Knowledge and ActionPyrrhonian Skepticism and Human  AgencyERNEST SOSA  1Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Action STEPHEN HETHERINGTON  18Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and  Epistemic AgencyBARON REED  402. Agency and ResponsibilityRational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’  RALPH WEDGWOOD  70Obsessive Thoughts and Inner VoicesLUCY O’BRIEN  93The Possibility of Epistemic ResponsibilityMIGUEL´ANGEL FERNANDEZ 109Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic AgencyCONOR MCHUGH  132Is Epistemic Agency Possible?  PASCAL ENGEL  158Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts  KIERAN SETIYA  179Can Virtue Epistemology Capitalize on JTB’s Appeal?E. J. COFFMAN  1993. Intellectual VirtuesIn Defense of ReflectionVALERIE TIBERIUS  223Intellectual AutonomyLINDA ZAGZEBSKI  244A Neo-Stoic Approach to Epistemic AgencySARAH WRIGHT  262Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves for Epistemic ImprovementKRISTOFFER AHLSTROM-VIJ  2764. Reasoning and Epistemic NormsScope for Rational AutonomyMARK SCHROEDER  297Why We Reason the Way We DoNISHI SHAH  311Cognitive Diversity and Epistemic NormsJESSICA BROWN  326Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical ReasonsMICHAEL P. LYNCH  343The Rejection of Epistemic ConsequentialismSELIM BERKER  363What Is an Inference?  RAM NETA  388Errata  408