This book attempts to explicate and expand upon Frank Ramsey's notion of the realistic spirit. In so doing, it provides a systematic reading of his work, and demonstrates the extent of Ramsey's genius as evinced by both his responses to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the impact he had on Wittgenstein's later philosophical insights.
S.J. Methven is Junior Research Fellow and College Lecturer in Philosophy at Worcester College, Oxford. He completed his Ph.D at Cambridge University, before which he received an MPhil and BA from Birkbeck College, University of London.
Recensioner i media
“Methven’s book is a welcome contribution to the study of Ramsey’s philosophy. It contains a wealth of interesting analyses and sheds much light on Ramsey’s initial dependence on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and how eventually he got beyond this. Methven’s book is probably the most thorough analysis ever published of Ramsey’s engagement with the Tractatus.” (Paolo Mancosu, Philosophia Mathematica, Vol. 29 (1), February, 2021)“This book is a welcome contribution to the history of analytic philosophy, a field that has been thriving in recent times. Obviously the author is very knowledgeable in the history of the analytic tradition. The book is written in a clear and concise style … . It is an excellent contribution to the history of analytic philosophy, and I recommend it to everyone interested in this field.” (Günther Eder, Mathematical Reviews, April, 2018)
Innehållsförteckning
Table Of Contents Acknowledgements Abbreviations Introduction PART I: THE REALISTIC SPIRIT 1. The Realistic Spirit 1.1. Realism And The Realistic 1.2. Playing Not-Bridge 1.2.1. Three Contrasts 1.2.2. Playing And Contravention 1.2.3. The Comfort Of Pretence 1.2.4. Parsimony And Pretending 2. Empiricism, Solipsism And The Realistic 2.1. Empiricism And The Realistic 2.1.1. Berkeley, Russell, And The Language Of God 2.1.2. The Given 2.2. Solipsism And The Realistic 3. Pragmatism And The Realistic 3.1. Probability 3.1.1. Degrees Of Belief 3.1.2. Peirce And Probability 3.1.3. Rationality, Inquiry And Reasonableness 3.2. Truth 3.2.1. On Truth 3.2.2. Truth And Inquiry 3.3. Ramsey As Pragmatist PART II: MEANING 4. Ramsey And Wittgenstein: First Encounters 4.1. Pictures 4.1.1. Representation And Sense 4.1.2. Pictorial And Logical Form 4.2. Propositions 4.2.1. Type And Token 4.2.2. Truth And Meaning 5. The Mystical 5.1. Ramsey And The Mystical 5.1.1. Internal Properties 5.1.2. Making Clear 5.2. Ramsey And Nonsense 5.2.1. Existential Statements 5.2.2. Identity Statements 5.2.3. Logical And Semantic Properties 5.2.4. Mathematical Statements 5.2.5. Ramsey And Semantics 6. Truth And Meaning 6.1. Facts And Judgement 6.2. Judgement 6.2.1. Chicken Beliefs 6.2.2. Beliefs, Private States And Representation 6.3. Belief And Representation 6.3.1. Names, Objects And Antirealism 6.3.2. Mental Signs 6.3.3. Belief And Causation 6.3.4. Belief, Language And Forms Of Life 6.4. Objections 6.4.1. Judging Nonsense 6.4.2. What Is Squiggle? 6.4.3. Realism And The Realistic PART III: MATHEMATICS 7. The Foundation Of Mathematics 7.1. Tractarian Logicism 7.2. Identity In The Tractatus 7.2.1. Wittgenstein On Identity 7.2.2. The Tractarian Convention 7.3. Ramsey's Definition Of '=' 7.3.1. The Problem Of Essential Classes 7.3.2. Identity In Principia 7.3.3. Propositional Functions In Extension 7.3.4. What Could A PFE Be? 8. Logical Revolt 8.1. Ramsey And Hilbert 8.1.1. Generalisation 8.1.2. The -Operator 8.2. The Entscheidungsproblem 8.2.1. Decidability And The Logic Of The Tractatus PART IV: INFLUENCE 9. Generality, Rules And Normativity 9.1. Generality 9.1.1. Quantification In The Tractatus 9.1.2. Ramseys' Criticisms 9.1.3. Ramsey And The Infinite 9.1.4. Wittgenstein And The Infinite 9.2. Rules And Normativity 9.2.1. Philosophical Investigations 81 9.2.1. Rules And Games 9.2.3. Normativity References
