Understanding Philosophy of Science

James Ladyman is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Bristol, UK. He is co-editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

• IntroductionSection I: The Scientific Method Chapter 1: Induction1.1 The Sceptic’s Challenge 1.2 The Scientific Revolution 1.3 The ‘New Tool’ of Induction1.4 Naïve InductivismChapter 2: Problems of Observation and Induction2.1 The Problem of Induction 2.2 Solutions and Dissolutions of the Problem of Induction 2.3 Inductivism and the History of Science 2.4 Theory and Observation 2.5 ConclusionChapter 3: Falsificationism3.1 Popper and the Critique of Marxism and Psychoanalysis 3.2 Popper’s ‘Solution’ to the Problem of Induction 3.3 The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification 3.4 The Duhem Problem 3.5 Problems with Falsificationism 3.6 Sophisticated InductivismChapter 4: Revolutions and Rationality4.1 The Received View of Science 4.2 Kuhn’s Revolutionary History of Science4.3 Paradigms and Normal Science 4.4 The Copernican Revolution 4.5 Theory and Observation 4.6 Incommensurabilty 4.7 Post-Kuhnian views of the scientific method 4.8 Relativism, reason and the science wars 4.9 Science, History and societySection II: Realism and Antirealism about ScienceChapter 5: Scientific Realism5.1 Appearance and Reality 5.2 The Metaphysics of the External World 5.2.1 Realism and Ideaism5.2.2 Idealism 5.3 Semantics 5.3.1 Logical Positivism 5.3.2 Semantic Instrumentalism and Reductive Empiricism 5.3.3 Truth 5.4 Standard Scientific Realism 5.5 AntirealismChapter 6: Underdetermination6.1 Underdetermination 6.1.1 Weak Underdetermination 6.1.2 Strong Underdetermination6.1.3 The Duhem-Quine Thesis 6.1.4 Responses to the Underdetermination Argument6.2 Constructive Empiricism 6.2.1 Objections to Constructive Empiricism 6.2.1.1 The Observable and Unobservable 6.2.1.2 Acceptance and Belief 6.2.1.3 Selective Scepticism?Chapter 7: Explanation and Inference to the Best Explanation7.1 Explanation 7.1.1 The Covering Law Model of Explanation7.1.1.1 The Deductive-Nomological Model 7.1.1.2 The Inductive Statistical Model 7.1.1.3 Problems with the Covering-Law account 7.1.2 Other Theories of Explanation 7.2 Inference to the Best Explanation7.2.1 The Local Defence of Scientific Realism 7.2.2 The Global Defence of Realism 7.2.3 Van Fraassen’s Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation 7.3 Common Sense, Realism and Constructive EmpiricismChapter 8: Confirmation and Evidence8.1 Nicod’s criterion and Hempel’s symmetry thesis 8.2 The paradoxes of confirmation 8.3 Bayesianism8.4 Evidence and TimeChapter 9: Realism About What?9.1 Theory Change 9.1.1 Approximate Truth 9.1.2 Sense and Reference 9.1.3 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 9.1.3.1 Realist Responses 9.1.3.2 Novelty 9.1.4 Counterexamples to the No-Miracles Argument 9.1.4.1 Realist Responses to the Counterexamples 9.2 Multiple Models 9.3 Idealisation 9.4 Structural RealismBibliographyGlossary